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ABSTRACT 
When the Boer War ended in 1902, Great Britain began to analyze 
her extremely poor performance in that conflict. For decades, her 
army had accomplished its assigned missions on numerous colonial cam-
paigns and expeditions. But the Boer War clearly demonstrated that 
her old military practices and attitudes were terribly outdated. In 
August 1914, when the First World War engulfed Europe, Britain fielded 
the best trained, equipped, and led army in the world. 
In the twelve years between the end of the Boer War and the start 
of the Great War, England had completely refurbished her army. Most 
of the credit for preparing the British Expeditionary Force belongs to 
Lieutenant-General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, General Officer Command-
ing-in-Chief, Aldershot Command, 1907-1912. He improved the living 
conditions of the soldiers; injected realism into marksmanship, train-
ing, and maneuvers; taught the cavalry to fight dismounted with rifles; 
developed the initiative and self-respect of the individual soldier; 
and most importantly, streamlined Britain's haphazard mobilization pro-
cedures. 
Although he played a key role in the early months of combat, his 
major contribution toward winning the war to end all wars was his far-
sighted and sound training programs and reforms during the four years 
that he was in command at Aldershot. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At 6:30 p.m. of the first Monday of August, 1914, a soldier walked 
out a side door of the headquarters of the British army at Aldershot, 
crossed the wide lawn, and raised three large, black spheres to the 
top of the flagpole. These three black balls were the official signal 
for the mobilization of the British Expeditionary Force. 1 Soldiers at 
Aldershot had been drilled on mobilization orders during many training 
exercises. Each seemingly trivial detail in the gathering of men, sup-
plies, and equipment had been tested, improved, retested, improved again, 
and retested again in an almost never ending cycle until every biscuit, 
cleaning rod, and nose-bag had its own prescribed niche. 
But this mobilization was not a mere training exercise; it was the 
reason behind the endless practise, for on the next day, August 4, Great 
Britain declared war on Germany. For the most part, the soldiers acted 
very much like they had during the previous rehearsals. However, the 
Officers' Mess did make a concession to custom by posting two notices: 
"Officers may wear Service dress or blue undress jackets in the Mess," 
and "Officers are particularly requested to pay their mess bill before 
leaving."2 
On Wednesday, August 5, each commander received a Top Secret file 
containing his unit's movement orders to an unspecified port of embarka-
tion. This movement was not the traditional 11hurry up and wait 11 common 
to most army operations. Every superfluous minute was trimmed from the 
1 
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master schedule; most battalions were allowed only ten minutes to 
entrain all personnel. Sixty hours were allotted for the movement of 
350 troop trains to Southampton, but the system was so well prepared 
that only forty-five hours were needed. 3 
When the British Expeditionary Force landed in France, it was the 
best equipped, trained, and led army in the world--"a rapier among 
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scythes." Based on Great Britain's past history of military prepared-
ness and competence in mobilization, few military observers would have 
believed the British army capable of such a flawless demonstration of 
professionalism and attention to detail. 5 
England's ability to overcome her traditional heritage of incred-
ible military muddle and bumbling incompetence caught many observers 
by surprise and has prompted questions from historians as to how this 
was accomplished. Answers to these inquiries are many, but most revolve 
around the reforms debated after the turn of the twentieth century and 
achieved during the period from 1907 to 1912 when the regulars at Alder-
shot were commanded by a very special general--a general who forged and 
honed that British "rapier." This swordsmith, who anticipated the 
nature of the First World War, was Lieutenant-General Sir Horace Lock-
wood Smith-Dorrien, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Aldershot 
Command. 
This thesis explores the impact Smith-Dorrien had upon the British 
army during his four years at Aldershot--England's paramount military 
installation. Specifically, this paper will relate how he improved the 
living conditions of the soldiers, injected realism into marksmanship, 
training, and maneuvers; taught the cavalry to fight dismounted with 
3 
rifles; streamlined Britain's haphazard mobilization procedures; and 
developed the initiative and self-respect of the private soldier. Also 
this study will attempt to portray the army of the period and describe 
its transformation from an obsolete organization oriented toward pun-
itive colonial expeditions to a truly modern army able to hold its own 
against Europe's best. 
When Smith-Dorrien assumed command at Aldershot in December 1907, 
the army was akin to a well-tried iron blade of an obsolete pattern. 
And while the sword's victories over the past seventy-five years were 
considerable, its edge was dulled and nicked. Outdated attitudes, 
tactics, and equipment were like layers of rust that covered cracks and 
imperfections in the weapon. These flaws had not been noticed in combat 
against the crude weapons of savages, but they could cause the sword to 
splinter were it to clash against a modern steel sabre wielded by a 
professional. 
In one sense, the Boer War (1899-1902) was a timely intervention 
before Great Britain had to encounter a modern army. When England par-
ried Germany's thrust into France in August 1914, it was with a far 
better weapon than the one she used in South Africa against the tenacious 
Boers. 
Great Britain's dismal and pathetic floundering during the Boer War 
starkly revealed the shortcomings and deficiencies in the British mili-
tary system. England dispatched 400,000 men into the South African 
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veldt to defeat some 50,000 farmers. In order to appreciate fully the 
extraordinary efforts expended in converting the army from what it was in 
1900 to the "magnificient fighting machine" that stepped onto the shores 
4 
of France fourteen years later, a review of the British army in its 
"before" phase is necessary. 
Until the Boer War, Great Britain had little reason to be dissatis-
fied with her army. Her soldiers, every one a volunteer, had seen 
active service in every year between 1837 and 1900. An incomplete 
tally would include 225 separate campaigns and expeditions to virtually 
every part of the empire's distant fringes and beyond--from Abyssinia 
7 to Zululand, from Burma to New Zealand. Throughout Britain's empire, 
regimental colors signified the presence of the armed power backing 
English interests abroad. Remote and numerous graves outlined by 
whitewashed rocks (the soldier's final "bit o' Britain") gave mute 
testimony to the willingness of the authorities to exercise that power. 
With the prominent exceptions of the disasters at Isandhlwana 
(1879), Maiwand (1880), and Majuba Hill (1881), the troops and their 
officers accomplished their assigned missions. If the bureaucracy and 
the staff "mucked-up" everything, "Tonuny Atkins," with his patient 
plodding and dogged steadfastness, could be relied upon to finish the 
campaign triumphant. Except for the dust, these colonial actions were 
nothing like an Aldershot parade ground. Instead, they were a demand-
ing, unforgiving, and exceedingly thorough martial finishing school for 
all ranks. 
While European commanders studied problems of mass organization, 
mobilization, and maneuver, English officers in mountain, desert, and 
jungle operations dealt with the challenges of near-impossible terrain, 
improvised logistics, and extended communications. Innovative field 
commanders relied more upon a plan that was tailored to the particular 
demands of each situation than on a "system" to be universally applied. 
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Staff work was circumscribed by each general's personality, and 
there was no uniformity of procedure. Staff officers were picked as 
favors to old comrades and " . . consisted largely of kinfolk or 
friends, selected as much for their personal congeniality as for their 
ability to perform their not very difficult duties." 8 This collective 
body of colonial experience grew into a "small war" mentality that was 
well suited to the isolated outposts on India's northwest frontier 
but incapable of withstanding the stress of a major European 
confrontation. 
Britain's opponent in her little wars was " ... a pore benighted 
'eathen but a first-class fightin' man." 9 These heathen ranged from 
religious zealots in the Sudan deserts, to crafty bandits in the Afghan 
mountains, to cannibal kings in the West African jungles. Since England 
was ever victorious against these primitives, were not her methods, 
tactics, and attitudes still valid? Since the regimental square and 
volley fire had won the day in 1898 at the battle of Omdurman as it had 
in the ten decades before the battle, would it not be just as decisive 
for the next ten? As long as the British officer was a gallant gentle-
man and the British soldier an automaton sewed in a scarlet tunic, then 
would not England always prevail on the battlefield? It took the Boers, 
a small group of hardy settlers and farmers, in South Africa to provide 
the answers to these questions: an unequivical "No!" 
Armed with modern Mauser rifles with smokeless cartridges and pro-
tected by entrenchments, the Boers' devastatingly accurate firepower 
shattered regiments, reputations, and rationale alike. "War had been 
proclaimed between rigid formulas and a healthy, untrammeled common 
6 
sense."10 It was humiliating and bewildering war for beribboned 
commanders. 
Boer soldiers were mounted but fought on foot as individuals; the 
British soldier was " .•. no more than a mindless brick in a moving 
11 
wall of flesh." Press correspondents and soldiers' letters kept the 
public informed of Britain's martial impotence. After three years, 
enough men and money ultimately bought victory but the price was high. 
Too many flaws had been revealed in the army; meaningful military reform 
and constructive reorganization of Britain's armed forces could wait no 
longer. 
Military reform was an old subject to the "Soldiers of the Queen." 
In the twenty years from 1860 to 1880, there were eighty-nine different 
official investigating bodies poking about in the army's affairs. 12 
Recommendations from these commissions were mixed, but some were far 
reaching, especially those concerned with improving the living condi-
tions of the private soldier. Flogging and branding were abolished 
(except in war), and medical advancements and better sanitation reduced 
deaths from disease. Commissions could no longer be bought and sold; 
the Horse Guards and the War Office were combined into a single depart-
ment and subordinated to the Secretary of State for War. Regiments were 
"localized" by linking their recruiting to a specific area. Yet, while 
there was progress, most measures did not go far enough, were introduced 
too late, or were crippled by compromise. 
In 1890, Lord Hartington received a Royal Commission to review the 
organization and functions of the War Office and the Admiralty. His com-
mittee's report, The Report of the Royal Commissioners Appointed to 
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Enquire into the Civil and Professional Administration of the Naval 
and Military Departments and the Relation of those Departments to Each 
Other and to the Treasury, was a progressive document. It proposed 
the abolition of the position of Commander-in-Chief, the establishment 
of a General Staff, the formation of a Committee of Imperial Defense, 
and the creation of an Army Council which would be responsible for the 
entire army. These reforms were too radical for the ultra-conservative 
War Office and would not be accepted. Although these sound and proper 
suggestions were not acted upon, they were not forgotten. 13 
As the war in South Africa died down in 1902, a different type of 
war began back in England with the battleground in the chambers of 
Parliament and in the letters to the editor columns. For once, the 
public and the politicians were concerned about the army's failures, 
with the result that commission after commission was formed to investi-
gate and report. 
Among the first probes to be published in 1902 was the Report of 
the Committee Appointed to Consider the Education and Training of the 
Officers of the Army (the Akers-Douglas Committee). It was no surprise 
when the paper concluded that junior officers had " . . a lack of 
professional knowledge and skill, and of any wish to study the science 
and master the art of their profession."14 
Also in 1902, a Royal Warrant established the Norfolk Commission 
to propose the future organization of the Militia and Volunteers. Their 
recommendation of universal compulsory military training to replenish 
the reserves used in the Boer War was not politically acceptable be-
cause of England's ancient distrust of a large standing army. 15 
8 
In 1903, the Report of His Majesty's Commissioners on the War in 
South Africa was published. These commissioners were " .. to inquire 
into the supply of men, ammunition, equipment, and transport by sea and 
land in connection with the campaign, and into the military operations 
up to the occupation of Pretoria."16 Over 22,200 questions were asked 
of 114 witnesses during the fifty-five days the committee was in ses-
sion. 17 Their report found fault with" almost every aspect of 
the army and its organization, from Wolseley, the then Commander-in-
Chief, down to the private soldier."18 
Also in 1903, the Report of the Committee Appointed by the Secretary 
of State for War to Enquire into the Nature of the Expenses Incurred by 
Officers of the Army and to Suggest Measures for Bringing Commissions 
within the Reach of Men of Moderate Means (Lord Stanley's Committee) 
formalized the common knowledge that it was impossible for an officer 
to live on his army salary without some other source of income. 
But the most important investigative body was convened by the 
Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, in 1902. It was called the War Office 
(Reconstitution) Committee, but was better known as the Esher Committee. 
Lord Reginald Esher, its chairman, was a close friend of Edward VII, 
and acted as the King's personal representative. Esher had gained 
valuable insight and experience concerning the army's problems and 
administration as a member of the Royal Commission that investigated the 
war in South Africa. Admiral Sir John (later Lord) Fisher, Sir George 
Clark, and Colonel F.G. Ellison were also members. Unlike other 
committees, this group did not take any public testimony, and when its 
report was published in February, 1904, its recommendations were 
accepted. 
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Three fundamental suggestions were made: the total reorganization 
of the War Office, the formation of a General Staff, and the establish-
ment of an Army Council. 19 From an organizational viewpoint, implemen-
tation of the first two items was obstructed by the position of Commander-
in-Chief. This office was now finally abolished and Lord Roberts, who 
wore a Victoria Cross for forty-six years, discovered when he walked into 
a completely empty office, that he was the last incumbent. 20 He would be 
replaced by the new Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Neville 
Lyttleton. All civilian and parliamentary control of the army was 
wielded by the Secretary of State for War who, as chairman of the Army 
Council, presided over the other six members: the Chief of the General 
Staff (First Military Member), the Adjutant-General (Second Military 
Member), the Quartermaster-General (Third Military Member), the Master-
General of Ordinance ~ourth Military Member), the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary, and the Financial Secretary. Those members opposed to any 
majority decision had the choice of either accepting the vote or resigning. 
Implementation of the Esher Report could not be done immediately--
it would take several years and the talents of an exceptional adminis-
trator, Richard Burdon Haldane, Secretary of State for War, to accomplish 
the myriad of details. Haldane, a brillant lawyer, had absolutely no 
military experience but was T~ise enough to study his subject before 
plunging into his complex job. When asked about his intentions and 
ideas, he assured the concerned generals on the Army Council that he 
II was a young and blushing virgin just united to a bronzed warrior, 
10 
and that it was not expected by the public that any result of the union 
21 
appear until at least nine months had passed." 
Haldane wanted the army oriented toward an overseas mission; " 
the primary task which rests upon the British Army is to maintain the 
defence of an Empire which extends over twelve millions of square miles 
22 
and embraces a population of 400 million people." This was in direct 
opposition to the policy set forth by Edward Stanhope, Secretary of 
State for War, in 1891. In a document known as the Stanhope Memorandum, 
the priorities from first to last of the British army were to put 
muscle behind the civil power in the United Kingdom, to maintain a neces-
sary force in India, to garrison all coaling stations and fortresses 
at home and abroad, to provide for home defence, and if necessary, to 
send two corps overseas. "But it will be distinctly understood that 
the probability of the employment of an army corps in the field in any 
European War is sufficiently improbable to make it the primary duty of 
the military authorities to organize our forces for the defences of 
23 this country." 
As expected, the reformers attempts to restructure the military 
administration met stubborn resistance and delaying tactics by the more 
conservative officers. Petty jealousies and internal rivalries surfaced 
at the War Office over the new role of the General Staff which was estab-
lished in September, 1906, with seventy-two officers. 24 Because of this 
turmoil and confusion about responsibilities, it was not until the period 
of 1907-1909 that the General Staff had a streamlined War Office became 
f . . 1. 25 a unct1on1ng rea 1ty. Demands for officers trained in the new 
procedures spurred the Staff College at Camberly out of the doldrums 
and gave it a whole new meaning and purpose for existence. 
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Perhaps the greatest challenge that Haldane met involved the recon-
stitution of a national reserve of trained soldiers that was exhausted 
during the Boer War. Opposition was bitter, but with the King's support, 
Haldane finally had his way in 1907. Haldane combined the Militia and 
the Volunteers into a single Territorial Force that was tied to the 
regular army in time of war. Britain's regulars (all volunteers) were 
allotted to his new Field Force. This Field Force was " ... to be so 
completely organized as to be ready in all aspects for mobilization 
immediately on the outbreak of a great war."26 At the center of this 
Field Force lay the Expeditionary Force of six infantry divisions and 
one cavalry division, all of which were to be ashore in France in 
fifteen days. State of the art in 1907 required two months for the 
80,000 men to be mobilized and transported to Europe. 27 And at the 
heart and core of the Expeditionary Force was the Aldershot Command, 
where the retraining of the army would begin in tactics, staff work, 
administration, leadership, and, most importantly, attitudes. 
Previous reforms were but small gusts of air in the stale and 
stuffy army offices at the Horse Guards and Pall Mall. These gusts 
only stirred up the dust that lay thick upon the brick-red, calf-hide 
bound volumes of obsolete regulations, policies, and procedures. 
Haldane's reforms were a fresh, strong, invigorating wind that blew 
both the dust and the volumes from the pidgeon-holes and book shelves 
down the twisty corridors and out of the War Office. A new sense of 
professionalism and purpose was injected into the army. 
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It was an exciting time for a forward-looking officer. Technology 
challenged the military to find the proper doctrine and tactics to 
utilize the new weapons of war such as the machine gun, airplane, wire-
less communications, and the combustion engine to their fullest 
potential. Teamed with the advances made by science were those improve-
ments in military methods that evolved from thoughtful analysis of 
practical experience. The relative worth of concepts such as the 
systematic cooperation between staff officers; individual marksmanship, 
universal military service: dismounted cavalry; imperial defence 
schemes; realistic training; and the building up the worth, intelligence, 
and initiative of the individual soldier provided the substance for 
acrimonous debates in and out of the military. Nearly every major 
magazine and periodical carried "suggestions," "replies," and "proposals" 
by armchair commanders, "Staff Officers," "Old Veterans," and men of 
28 
note and repute. Progressive officers intended to fuse the good of 
the old army--the discipline, esprit, and dependability, to the modern 
developments of the present. 
It was difficult, however, to exorcise the ghost of the Duke of 
Cambridge, who, as Commander-in-Chief for more than forty years, 
struggled against every reform that would have changed the army from 
what it was in Wellington's day. Pampered products of his ultra-
conservatism were many and powerful. These antiquated generals and 
colonels were deeply entrenched within the establishment and their 
minds were fossilized in a groove worn by daily repetition of duties 
familiar to officers at Waterloo. Nevertheless, there were many 
dedicated people, civilian and military, who pushed and prodded 
13 
Britain's lumbering, old, toothless lion of an army into the twentieth 
century and proceeded to get him into shape, outfit him with dentures. 
and sharpen his claws. 
By 1907, Smith-Dorrien was finally in a position where he could 
supervise the lion's refitting and guide the refurbished army across 
the threshold of an entirely new era. Smith-Dorrien was not a miracle 
worker or a gifted genius--he was, however, a dedicated, intelligent, 
and forceful man who was farsighted enough to anticipate the demands of 
a modern war. His ideas were seasoned by more than thirty years of 
active service and six major campaigns. He was steeped in the mysteries 
of the army until his bones absorbed the crimson dye from his wool tunic. 
No other general on the Army List knew the British soldier and his needs 
as well as Smith-Dorrien. Still, he was a product of the British 
military system. 
A review of his life and service up to 1907 is helpful since, in 
many ways, his career was representative of those of his contemporaries. 
Smith-Dorrien, however, never lost his stubborn individualism and 
independent approach--traits usually filed away by the "system," for 
though the army mill turned slowly--it usually ground fine and uniformly. 
Smith-Dorrien's reforms were the result of thoughtful analysis of events 
during those thirty years. His earlier experiences provide the depth 
and perspective from which those reforms may be viewed. When set 
against the background formed by the status of Britain's army in 1907, 
his achievements during his four years at Aldershot stand forth bright, 
clear, and proud. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE SWORDSMITH 
Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien, eleventh of fifteen children, was 
born on May 26, 1858. His father, R.A. Smith-Dorrien, was a well-
established country gentleman and a colonel in the county militia. As 
a young boy, he was, in his own words, " ... mischievous and wild, 
and credited with all minor catastrophes which happened to the family." 1 
He was educated at Harrow where his only distinction, besides a penchant 
for wild escapades and pranks, was as a cross-country runner. 2 
Smith-Dorrien could not decide on a future vocation, and finally, 
in desperation, his father suggested the army--a traditional refuge 
for the younger sons of the gentry. Excited by this idea, Smith-Dorrien 
entered a crammer in 1875 to prepare for the December entrance examina-
tion to the Royal Military College at Sandhurst. 3 
To the astonishment of his family, he passed the exam, and upon 
graduation in January, 1877, joined the 95th (Derbyshire) Regiment of 
Foot. Since the nineteen year old "passed out with special mention," 
he received one year's antedate and entered his unit as a lieutenant. 4 
His regiment was stationed at Dublin and Cork where some of his memories 
were of racing, dancing, and hunting--the three important aspects of a 
young gentleman's education. 
A zest for "practical soldiering" and a restless impatience with 
inefficiency were two character traits that surfaced early in 
17 
18 
Smith-Dorrien's career. In 1878, when his battalion commander refused 
to allow him to be released for service in the Zulu War, Smith-Dorrien 
by-passed his chain of command and wired directly to the War Office 
that he was ready to go. His unique approach worked and he received 
orders ". . to proceed forthwith to Dartmouth and embark in the 
Edinburgh Castle." Although this act confirmed the young lieutenant's 
willingness to abandon established procedures and to trust in his own 
judgement, Smith-Dorrien later confessed that his unorthodox action 
" .. was an unwarrantable piece of cheek, and inexcusable, 
It would not be the last time that he would show some enterprise and 
disobey orders if he felt the situation merited it. 
Smith-Dorrien's first assignment in South Africa was supervising 
oxdrawn wagons with the transport corps. Since watching oxen held few 
chances for glory, he volunteered to act as a courier when his duties 
in the supply column permitted. On January 22, 1879, he had just 
delivered a bundle of messages to the British camp at Isandhlwana when 
a vastly superior force of Zulu warriors attacked and overwhelmed the 
unprepared units. For his first time in combat, he did rather well; his 
intrepid conduct earned him nominations on two separate incidents for 
the Victoria Cross--England's highest award for gallantry. He was one 
of the five officers who survived the ensuing slaughter, and his epic 
escape included a three mile cross-country race against twenty Zulus. 
All in all, he was on the move for forty-two hours that included " 
a stretch of twenty miles on foot, much of it at a run .... "6 
Although he escaped the Zulus, he was subsequently caught by a 
greater killer of soldiers--typhoid. He was carried in a mule wagon 
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over seventy, tooth-grinding, primitive miles to Ladysmith where he 
experienced the comfort of an army hospital by spending two months on 
the straw-covered floor of a Dutch church. Smith-Dorrien was still too 
weak to walk when he heard of the final campaign to destroy the Zulus. 
During the night, he escaped from the hospital on his batman's back and 
rejoined his transportation column in support of Colonel Evelyn Wood's 
7 force. 
At the end of the Zulu War in August, 1879, Smith-Dorrien returned 
to Great Britain and his regiment. Two years of routine garrison duty 
would pass before he would have another chance to be under fire. In 
1882, England sent an expedition under Sir Garnet Wolseley to stabilize 
the crisis in Egypt which threatened British interests. 
Part of that expedition included the 95th Foot, now redesignated 
as the 2nd Battalion of the Sherwood Foresters, which landed in 
Alexandria on August 21, 1882. Smith-Dorrien was promoted the next day 
to captain and became the Assistant Chief of Police in Alexandria, a 
job that ended twelve days later when his old commander, Sir Evelyn 
Wood, asked him to organize an impromptu mounted infantry unit. 
This hastily assembled band was required because Wolseley took all 
the cavalry and left Wood behind in Alexandria without a mobile force to 
prevent the Bedouins and Egyptian rebels from harassing their supply 
lines. Since the quartermaster was unresponsive to his requirements, 
Smith-Dorrien showed his resourcefulness and boldness by confiscating 
saddles from the local merchants and bluffing his way past the startled, 
loyal Egyptian guards so he could ransack the stables at the Khedive's 
palace for additional mounts and equipment. In less than thirty minutes, 
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he had collected a scratch force shakily astride twelve ponies, two 
mules, and one donkey; by dusk, he had pushed back several enemy 
patrols. In a few days, Srnith-Dorrien had "found" enough animals to 
increase his force to nearly sixty men. Although his new command was 
not a regiment of dragoon guards, what his "somewhat motley detachment" 
lacked in size and horsemanship was more than compensated for by its 
young captain's dash, aggressiveness, and extraordinary talents in 
field improvisation. Srnith-Dorrien performed his duties so well that 
Wood mentioned his exploits in his dispatches. 9 
Hostilities ended with Wolseleyts victory at the Battle of Tel 
el-Kebir on September 13, and by February, 1883, Srnith-Dorrien and the 
Sherwood Foresters had sailed for India. His first tour, however, 
would be quite short. On an afternoon hunt, while enroute to their 
cantonment at Lucknow, Srnith-Dorrien injured his knee chasing a wounded 
peacock. After two months in the hospital in Lucknow, he 11 ••• was 
invalided horne with a stiff knee, swelled as big as a football." He 
almost lost his leg, but after an operation and more months in bed he 
was declared fit toward the end of 1883 and started back to India. 10 
While passing through the Suez Canal, Srnith-Dorrien met Sir Evelyn 
Wood, then Sirdar (commander) of the Egyptian army, who offered him a 
position in the Sudan. Duty in Egypt held a greater promise of excite-
ment than did service with his regiment in India, so he accepted upon 
Wood's pledge that he would be allowed to return to England to study 
for the Staff College exam the first year there was no fighting. 
Therefore, in February, 1884, he joined a brigade under Sir Francis 
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Grenfell and " . a jolly, happy, though busy, life I had." Serving 
in the Sudan with him were two future Field-Marshals and twelve general 
grade officers. 11 
For his first three months, Smith-Dorrien served in an infantry 
battalion and then in the Camel Corps. In May, 1883, he accepted the 
mission to raise a battalion of Turks. Because his bad knee kept him 
from participating in the Nile Expedition, he was given a staff position 
in the rear echelons of the army. It was during this period that he met 
another captain, Horatio Herbert Kitchener--a man he would see many 
times over the years. Smith-Dorrien was offered a company of mounted 
infantry early in 1885, but the Sirdar refused to release him because 
he " ... did the work of two and was too valuable." Smith-Dorrien was 
disappointed, but in March, 1885, his request for the vacancy as adjutant 
of a mounted infantry unit was approved because the Sirdar discovered 
that the young captain" ... was not indispensable--i.e. he had gotten 
to know me better."12 
Smith-Dorrien never missed an opportunity to see action, and his 
first independent command came on December 31, 1885. It consisted of a 
one-hundred-and-fifty-men mix of hussars, mounted infantry, Egyptian 
Camel Corps, and Egyptian cavalry followed by fifty men marching one 
day to his rear for support. He was forbidden to advance beyond a 
certain village, and his mission was to cooperate with a gunboat pur-
suing nine sailing nuggars (Arab river boats). When he reached his 
assigned limit, only one boat had been captured. Smith-Dorrien believed 
that the man on the spot had the final tactical decision and not some 
staff officer at a distant and uninformed headquarters. Since he had 
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reached his limit of advance, he could have easily turned around and 
proceeded back to camp having fulfilled the letter of his instructions. 
But in keeping with the spirit of his mission, he made the courageous 
decision to pursue the enemy boats, although to do so invited a possible 
courts-martialfordisobeying orders. His command covered sixty miles 
in twenty-four hours and captured the remaining eight boats after a 
sharp fight. This coup earned the thanks of the Commander-in-Chief 
(Sir Frederick Stephenson), and the new Sirdar (Sir Francis Grenfell), 
a mention in dispatches, and one of the new decorations for gallantry--
the Distinguished Service Order. "The fact that I had exceeded my 
instructions ... was overlooked, and only the successful results 
f ,,13 were re erred to. 
In February, 1886, Smith-Dorrien took his promised leave to begin 
his studies for the entrance exam for the Staff College, After two 
months at a crammer, he scored tenth on the test and arrived back in 
Egypt on June 30 in time to raise a Sudanese battalion and train it. 
Before he left for the Staff College in January, 1887, many of his 
friends felt that he was surrendering a sure success in the Egyptian 
army for something more indefinite. He answered that, " ... one could 
never become an up-to-date modern soldier in the prehistoric warfare to 
be met within campaigns against the Dervishes. "14 
Smith-Dorrien had a grand time at the Staff College. He did '' 
not think we were taught as much as we might have been, but there was 
15 plenty of sport and not too much work." It was the sport aspect that 
he concentrated on. He was a popular officer and was considered to be 
II .,16 s . h D . the ... dominating personality of that year. mlt - orrlen 
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initiated the Staff College Coach and was elected Master of the Drag, 
much to the chagrin of an ambitious cavalry classmate, Captain Douglas 
Raig. He somehow convinced the Commandant, General E.H. Clive, to 
allow the officers to hunt six days a week if they wanted. It was a 
long persistent rumor that after three months, Smith-Dorrien was asking 
d . . h l"b 17 1rect1ons to t e 1 rary. Despite being counciled for his inatten-
tion to his studies, he so impressed his classmates that when they 
drafted a complete staff for a future army corps, they listed him as 
18 the corps commander. 
Smith-Dorrien was a poor financial manager, and his expenses 
constantly exceeded his meager income. His sports activites and home 
bills contributed to a large debt of more than J 300, and loans were 
between thirteen to fourteen percent interest. 19 When the two year 
course was completed in December, 1888, he was, 
anxious to get away to India as soon as possible for 
three reasons. (1) Because during my short stay in India, 
I had been attracted by the life. (2) Because the standard 
of soldiering there was reputed high and practical. 20 (3) Because I had spent all my ready money and a bit more. 
He was not the first officer to go to India for the higher pay and 
lower costs, nor would he be the last. 
In India, Smith-Dorrien's p.s.c. (passed Staff College) meant 
little as it was more important to have influential friends at army 
headquarters at Simla. Smith-Dorrien lacked both "Simla Interest" and 
the desire for it. For the next eight years (1889-1896), Smith-
Dorrien kept the personnel clerks busy updating the assignment section 
of his official dossier. This was the period of his greatest profes-
sional growth. His experiences in a variety of staff and command 
positions formed the bedrock to which his reforms at Aldershot would 
be anchored. 
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In an era of a provincial outlook towards branches of the army 
other than one's own, Smith-Dorrien broke with tradition and sought 
service with the cavalry and artillery. This diversity of assignments 
led to a clearer understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of each 
component of the army and of the complex inter-relationships between 
them. Years later, at Aldershot, he would draw upon these experiences 
for the insights required to forge the rapier. 
His dedication and hard work throughout his tour in India finally 
came to the attention of Lord Roberts, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian 
Army and the empire's finest general. Lord Roberts marked him as one 
of the promising crop of future leaders and whether Smith-Dorrien wanted 
it or not, he definitely had "Simla Interest" now. 
During these years, Smith-Dorrien learned the Hindustani language, 
finally cleared all of his debts, and was promoted to major fifteen 
days before his thirty-fourth birthday. 21 When the Chitral Campaign on 
the Northwest Frontier bogged down in 1895, he was posted as the Deputy 
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General to a brigade held in 
reserve. Although he was with the unit from April until it was dis-
banded in August, the campaign was over before his brigade was in action. 
He did, however, see action on the race track. With Hurbert Gough, 
another future general as his jockey, Smith-Dorrien found the time in 
the Winter of 1895/96 to win nineteen horse races including the Army 
Cup, but his winnings of 13,000 rupees barely covered the expenses of 
maintaining his thirty-horse stud that included different horses for 
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. 1 . . k. h d . 1 . . d. 22 rac~ng, po o, p~g st~c ~ng, arness, an JUSt p a~n r~ ~ng. 
In the Fall of 1896, while on leave in England, Smith-Dorrien heard 
that Kitchener, Sirdar of the Egyptian army, was preparing for the Nile 
Expedition. He volunteered, but there was no position available. 
Several days later, on October 5, he discovered that his unit was on 
orders for an expedition into Afghanistan against the Afridis in the 
Tirah Valley. By the 23rd, he was in Bombay, and when he arrived at 
the advance base camp four days later he was given command of a half-
battalion. Expert hostile snipers armed with modern rifles, bitterly 
cold and strong winds, and some of the most rugged mountains in the 
world were basic ingredients of warfare in the Khyber Pass. It was 
II 
. the most dangerous and arduous struggle in which British troops 
have been engaged since the Indian Mutiny."23 
His brother officers were fortunate having Smith-Dorrien as their 
resourceful mess president. Even in one of the most forsaken places 
in creation, he managed on occasion to produce "A-1 food; pig's cheek, 
24 pate de fois gras, stilton, and port." While on campaign, Smith-
Dorrien wrote many letters to his friend and mentor, Sir Evelyn Wood 
about operations in the Tirah and the army's inadequacies. It took 
until April, 1898, to subdue the tribesmen, and by that time, Smith-
Dorrien had been mentioned in dispatches for gallantry in action and 
had received a brevet promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel effective May 20, 
25 
of that year. 
In April, 1898, Smith-Dorrien took eight months leave, while 
enroute home, he volunteered once more to serve under Kitchener in 
Egypt. This time the Sirdar told him that he could have his Sudanese 
battalion back. "After some search I found the 13th and announced 
that I had come to take command, and, as no one objected I did." 26 
Throughout the campaign and particularly at the Battle of Omdurman, 
Smith-Dorrien was deeply impressed with the firepower of machine guns 
26 
and modern rifles; on the battlefield, he saw " . enough horrors to 
last l •f . ,.27 a ~ et~me. 
Smith-Dorrien nearly made the history books as the commander of 
the British forces in a war with France over the "Fashoda Incident." 
Kitchener picked Smith-Dorrien to be the senior officer in command to 
accompany him to Fashoda, where a small French force had occupied a 
fort on disputed territory. Fortunately, Kitchener defused the delicate 
situation. For his services, Smith-Dorrien received the rank of 
Brevet-Colonel on November 16, 1898, and was mentioned once again in 
d . h 28 ~spate es. 
By December, Smith-Dorrien was in Malta where on January 1, 1899, 
he took command of the 1st Battalion Sherwood Foresters. He experiment-
ed with his new training ideas in combined operations, marksmanship, 
and the use of the machine gun. Smith-Dorrien was one of the few 
officers who cared deeply about his men and took every opportunity to 
improve their life. He helped the unit chaplain organize a soldiers' 
and sailors' club with the provision that religion would only be discuss-
29 
ed in a room on the top floor. Malta's climate aggrevated Smith-
Dorrien's occasional bouts of fever and neuralgia--his legacy of two 
decades of hard campaigning in unhealthy regions. His health otherwise 
was excellent for a man of forty-two. 
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In 1899, Smith-Dorrien turned down Kitchener's offer of the 
Governorship of the province of Omdurman and its £ 1000 salary for a 
chance in Britain's latest colonial involvement in South Africa. After 
repeated pleas to Sir Evelyn Wood, his unit received orders for the 
Boer War. 
They arrived in Durban, South Africa on December 13, 1899, during 
the "Black Week"--an unparalled set of defeats. Sir Redvers Buller was 
beaten at Colenso as was General Sir William Gatacre at Stormberg. Lord 
Methuen was whipped at Madder River and Magersfontein. Sir George White 
was besieged at Ladysmith after a fiasco at Nicholson's Nek, and 
Mafeking and Kimberly were cut off and surrounded. 
After this sobering series of defeats, the British army went into 
a period of relative inactivity, during which time its leaders reorga-
nized their forces and pondered what strategy they should follow. Smith-
Dorrien was exasperated with the delays. "I was very cross because I 
was forced to observe Christmas Day as a holiday, and am afraid I made 
some pointed remarks to the effect that we were not out there to 
observe Christmas Day." 30 
England sent Lord Roberts out to save the day with Major-General 
Lord Kitchener as his Chief of Staff. Smith-Dorrien knew that the 
tempo would pick up now that "Bobs 11 was in command. 
Smith-Dorrien worked long and hard preparing for action but on 
returning late to camp on February 2, he wrote, " •.. the fatigue was 
knocked bang out of me by a wire from Lord Roberts offering me a 
brigade."31 
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Smith-Dorrien's brigade, the 19th, had just been formed from four 
solid, dependable units, the 2nd Battalion Duke of Cornwall's Light 
Infantry, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, 2nd Battalion King's Shrop-
shire Light Infantry, and the Royal Canadian Regiment. It was part of 
the 9th Division under General Sir Henry Colvile, an inept officer, who 
would later be relieved of command. Nine days after assuming command, 
Smith-Dorrien was promoted to Major-General (February 11, 1900). He 
thereby became one of the youngest generals in the British army. 
Smith-Dorrien raged against the poor tactics that wasted lives to 
no effect. At Paardeberg, February 20, 1900, in the presence of Lord 
Roberts and Sir John French, the new general successfully resisted the 
suggestions of his two superiors, Colvile and Kitchener, to assault an 
entrenched laager over open ground. In the end, Smith-Dorrien's views 
on a bombardment and on sapping trenches forward to a closer assault 
. . f. 11 d 32 On . • 1 pos1t1on were 1na y accepte . ce, upon rece1v1ng a sense ess 
order from Colvile to withdraw immediately, an act that would force him 
to leave wounded and guns behind, Smith-Dorrien, outraged at such stu-
pidity, complied with the letter of the order. He sent a few men to 
the rear but then organized a skillful withdrawal under heavy fire and 
brought back the killed, wounded, and guns without any additional 
casualties. When he went to make his report, Colvile was asleep in a 
farm house with orders that he was not to be disturbed; '' ... and 
perhaps it was just as well, for I was boiling with indignation, and 
might have said a bit more than was discreet."33 
Smith-Dorrien spent long hours inspecting all the troops to see 
that they were getting supplies, equipment, and food. About the latter 
he was most careful. Once, he sent a telegram to the Director of 
Supplies at Pietretief: 
Many thanks for the bread;one sort excellent, the other 
is causing heavy casualties. You might use your influ-
ence with the Lieutenant-General and send large quantities 
of the latter to all Boer laagers, for I am convinced that 
such a measure would hasten termination of §he war; as long 
as they don't use the bread as projectiles. 4 
Smith-Dorrien was one of the few generals to emerge from the war 
with his reputation enhanced. Lord Roberts thought him the best 
brigadier in South Africa and so did another commander, Lieutenant-
29 
General Ian Hamilton. Sir John French wrote to him, "Selfishly I often 
wish you back again. I would give anything to have you helping me 
direct these operations Smith-Dorrien was " ... an active, 
fearless, fighting soldier, who was not afraid of responsibility and 
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and could get the best out of his troops." The London Gazette 
published his name in three different dispatches. 37 
On April 22, 1901, Smith-Dorrien was quite disappointed to hear that 
he was to leave the war and become the Adjutant-General of the Indian 
army. Next to the position of Commander-in-Chief, this was the most 
important post in India. Lord Curzon, the Viceroy, knew that the 
Indian army was woefully inadequate, He felt that Lord Kitchener as its 
Commander-in-Chief would be a start toward rectifying the situation. 
Lord Roberts, who replaced his arch-rival, Sir Garnet Wolseley, as 
Commander-in-Chief of the British army in December, 1900, knew that 
Kitchener and Curzon, both egotistical hotheads, would need a smooth, 
dedicated, professional to act as a buffer between them. For that 
reason he selected Smith-Dorrien to be the Adjutant-General. 
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Enroute to India, Smith-Dorrien was allowed home leave. At a 
dinner party given in his honor, a member of Parliament asked him how 
England might be best prepared for a future war. Smith-Dorrien, un-
aware of any press coverage, sketched an outline for compulsory service. 
Next morning, his scheme made the papers, and a furious Lord Roberts 
called him in to explain. Roberts also supported universal military 
training, but it was contrary to the government's policy at the time. 
Robert's influence and Smith-Dorrien's written apology to the Secretary 
of State for War, Sir John Brodrick, smoothed the episode over. 38 
Since Kitchener was still fighting Boers, Smith-Dorrien went on to 
Simla to assume his duties and initiate the long-overdue reforms. At 
every turn, he was blocked by the Military Department which answered 
only to the Viceroy. This dual control of the army was a severe handi-
cap. Curzon had an almost pathological dislike for the army and its 
officers, and soon the feeling was mutual. Smith-Dorrien was frustrated 
and angered. He concluded that " ... after struggling for eleven 
months, flapping against the bars of my cage, I decided finally that my 
position was intolerable, that I was drawing my pay under false pretenses, 
and I tendered my resignation "39 
General Sir Arthur Power Palmer, Acting Commander-in-Chief, con-
vinced Smith-Dorrien to take leave instead and to report to Kitchener 
about the obstacles awaiting him. Smith-Dorrien took advantage of the 
leave to get married to Miss Olive Croten Schneider. She was the niece 
of General Palmer. By October 23, they were back in Simla; Smith-
Dorrien had agreed to Lord Kitchener's proposal of remaining as Adjutant-
General until a suitable replacement could be found. 
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Kitchener was true to his word, and in April, 1903, Smith-Dorrien 
was awarded with one of the most important troop commands in India--
that of the 4th Infantry Division at Quetta, Baluchistan. Now he was 
free at last to expand his training ideas and reforms. He had moving 
targets installed to add realism and taught the soldiers to "snap 
shoot." 
One of the most useful innovations Smith-Dorrien ever developed 
was the "staff ride." Through this technique of tactical exercises 
without troops, officers could solve problems and react to new situa-
tions and orders under service conditions. After the exercise a 
conference would be held, actions critiqued, and the lessons learned 
bl . h d d d" "b d 40 were pu 1s e an 1str1 ute . This system is used, practically 
without change, in nearly every army today. Smith-Dorrien, who well 
understood the limitations of the cavalry, submitted his ideas on 
cavalry training to the Inspector-General of Cavalry, Major-General 
Douglas Haig, who told him that, " ... he could not improve upon it.'.4l 
Sir Ian Hamilton, who was observing the Russo-Japanese War, kept 
a very interested Smith-Dorrien posted on the war's developments. Smith-
Dorrien took his cue from these operations and had his companies, 
batteries, and squadrons prepare a massive trench system. This system 
had a front of 2000 yards, was three trench lines deep, complete with 
bunkers, latrines, command posts, and billets. All this work was done 
as part of the small unit training held in the spring and summer. 
During the annual autumn maneuvers, his 6000 men dug in 1700 yards from 
the "enemy entrenchments." During each night, they would sap forward, 
resupply, and dig in again before daylight. During the day everyone 
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had to remain hidden in their shelters. After four days of creeping 
forward, the command assaulted the position using live ammunition. At 
the conclusion, each unit was led by their captain through the entire 
system and the whole operation was discussed in detail. Smith-Dorrien, 
with justifiable pride wrote, "In ... looking back on it now, it was 
. d f f h h f . h G T·7 " 42 qu1.te a goo orecast o t e trenc war are 1.n t e reat Nar. While 
on leave in 1905, he observed the German Autumn Maneuvers and felt that 
the German tactics did not respect the awesome power of the defence 
protected by trenches and barbed wire and equipped with machine guns by 
h h ld . k d h . . . 1 d 43 t e way t e so 1.ers attac.e t ese pos1.t1.ons 1.n c ose or er. 
Army headquarters, which was notoriously stingy, recognized Smith-
Dorrien's superior training concepts by providing additional funds for 
expanded training programs. Smith-Dorrien's reforms were not limited 
to training. Since the recreation grounds were two miles from camp, 
they were not used often. He, therefore, had an ugly, rocky slope 
terraced off into cricket and football fields and planted with trees. 
His soldiers used " . a not very attractive native Bazaar, with all 
. d '11 f h d h . . . 1144 1.ts atten ant 1. s or t em to spen t e1.r t1.me 1.n. To remedy this, 
Smith-Dorrien borrowed money on his personal account, leased the land, 
and in the middle of his new grounds " built a really fine club for 
the men, with a dry and wet canteen, supper rooms, a billiard room with 
four tables, a dance-room convertible into a theatre, and some fourteen 
45 hot and cold baths." It was run entirely by non-commissioned officers 
and men. Much to the wonder of many, there \vas little rowdiness. 
Years at Quetta passed by quickly, and Smith-Dorrien and his wife 
were quite happy. Their first son, "Gren," was born in February, 1904. 
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In February, 1906, he " ... received the very gratifying news that I 
had been made full Colonel of my old regiment, the Sherwood Foresters."46 
It was an honor that he cherished always and a responsibility he never 
failed. There were many parties, dinners, and hunts. Among the guests--
private and official was the future King of England--the Prince of 
Wales. Smith-Dorrien and the Prince became fast friends and the Prince 
would visit as often as royal duties would permit. 
Smith-Dorrien's area of responsibility covered a large region with 
nearly 800 miles of frontier, the majority of it with Afghanistan. This 
required him to make long and frequent inspection tours, Although there 
were many forty-mile days on horseback, his attractive wife usually 
accompanied him; they both enjoyed these trips immensely. A major pur-
pose of these trips was to enable him and his soldiers to become better 
acquainted. "It was my invariable rule, if I dined with a regiment and 
was invited to play pool, to accept, as I found that a game round the 
billiard table gave me a better opportunity of getting to know the 
officers personally than any other way. ,,4 7 
Smith-Dorrients reputation was growing fast and in the right places. 
He was responsible for the building and impetus behind the Indian Staff 
College. In 1906, he was promoted to Lieutenant-General. When he was 
on leave in 1905, Lord Fisher and Sir George Clarke convinced him to 
brief the Secretary of State for India (Viscount Morely) and the Secre-
tary of State for War (Richard Burdon Haldane) on the Kitchener-Curzon 
feud. Both secretaries were impressed with him. ~~en Curzon was fired 
and Lord Minto became the new Viceroy, Minto forwarded glowing reports 
about Smith-Dorrien to Haldane and Morely. Both the Prince of Wales 
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and Kitchener recommended Smith-Dorrien to Haldane as Sir John French's 
replacement at the Aldershot Command. Lord Fisher and others expressed 
a desire that he be placed on the newly created Army Council. When 
Haldane sought nominations for French's successor, those asked listed 
their favorite general first and Smith-Dorrien second. 
Fortunately, Haldane recognized Smith-Dorrien as an unparalleled 
troop trainer and exactly the perfect man for Aldershot where the Secre-
tary of State for War's reforms would be hammered into reality by the 
new commander's drive. 49 The Times carried the posting: "Lieut.-Gen. 
H.L. Smith-Dorrien, C.B., D.S.O. (Notts and Derby Regt.) commanding 
the Quetta Division, Indian Army, has been appointed to succeed Gen. 
Sir John French in the Command of the Aldershot Corps. "50 Smith-
Dorrien recorded the event as well: "Early in January of 1907, a very 
great event occurred in my life, for I was selected to succeed Sir John 
French at the end of the year as C. in C. at Aldershot, the plum of the 
British Army .• "51 
Aldershot, Smith-Dorrien's plum, had been the traditional home of 
the British army since it was formally opened by Queen Victoria in July, 
1855. 52 It is located approximately thirty miles southwest of London 
in the Borough of Hampshire. Its name was derived from the Old English 
"alorsceat," meaning "wood of alders."53 King Alfred's will (ca. 880-
85 A.D.) contained the first written reference to Aldershot and over the 
years there have been nineteen different spellings. 54 
Eighteenth century outlaws like Dick Turpin and "Springheeled Jack" 
used the desolate wastelands and heath of Aldershot as sanctuaries. 
These same attributes led the area to be selected in 1792 as the site 
35 
for the first large scale maneuvers ever held by the British army. 
Aldershot's military association, however, is far older; it contains an 
earthen fort called Ceasar's Camp. This fort was built on the probable 
borders of the Regni and Belgae tribes and was used later by the Romans 
h . d . 55 w o ~mprove upon ~t. 
In 1853, the government decided to purchase the area for "military 
training purposes" because Dublin was the only other location large 
enough to support brigade field days. The Prince Consort was involved 
in the selection of the grounds and locations of the barracks. Permanent 
construction began in 1853 on what is now Wellington Lines and was com-
pleted in 1859. During this period, 1200 wooden huts were built on the 
present location of the Stanhope and Marlborough Lines. 56 
By 1861, Parliament had spent approximately £144,650 for about 
8000 acres. For the first two decades, the troops at Aldershot regarded 
it as a "soldiers penal settlement."57 It was the mobilization base for 
many major campaigns; Crimea was the first and was followed by the Zulu 
War (1879), Egypt (1882), Sudan (18B5-89), Sudan (1896-98), the Ashanti 
Expedition (1895), and the Boer War (1899-1902). 58 
During the first five years of the twentieth century, very little 
of the spirit and substance of the Haldane reforms had trickled down to 
the soldier. Military life at Aldershot was well established and the 
regiments were comfortable in the routine. These regiments and their 
component parts formed the steel core from which Smith-Dorrien would 
fashion Britain's rapier. 
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THE SHORD"S CORE 
\•Then England thought of her army, she usually thought in numbers 
of regiments and not in numbers of men. Regiments were an institution 
most peculiar to the British army. Nearly every army in the world had 
them, but most did not consider them as living shrines of glory. Royal 
decrees, warrants, and regulations; War Office directives, circulars, 
and memoranda; and various General Orders notwithstanding, each regi-
mental commander ran his unit as he saw fit. Once assigned to a 
regiment, a soldier would remain with the regiment for the rest of his 
military career. Officers and sergeants were careful to nurture the 
idea that the regiment was the new recruit's home. 
Field-Marshal Sir Garnet Wolseley once said, "Military spirit is 
made up of trifles. The soldier is a peculiar animal that can alone be 
brought to the highest efficiency by inducing him to believe that he 
belongs to a regiment which is infinitely superior to the others around 
h . ,1 liD. Similar sentiments were expressed by General Sir Ian Hamilton 
when he wrote, "The soldier feels the regiment solid about him. The 
Regiment! It is impossible for the foreigner to realize what that word 
means to a British soldier. The splendour--the greatness--the romance 
of this awe-inspiring wonderful creation in which he himself is privi-
ledged to have his being!" 2 But perhaps Rudyard Kipling best expressed 
this concept when he wrote that the regiment was the soldier's 
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... father, his mother, and indissolubly wedded wife, and 
that there was no crime under the canopy of heaven blacker 
than that of bringing shame on the Regiment, which was the 
best-shooting, best drilled, best set-up, bravest, most 
illustrous, and in all respects most desirable Regiment 
within the compass of the Seven Seas.3 
By 1907, a regiment ceased to exist as a tactical unit. Each 
battalion retained its regimental title so the word "regiment" and 
"battalion" were used for the same organization. Even though 
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"battalion" was more precise, i.e. 2nd Battalion West Yorkshire Regi-
ment, the use of its regimental designation was more common--the West 
Yorkshires. 
There were twenty-three of these regiments at Aldershot--three of 
cavalry and twenty of infantry. These forces were organized into one 
brigade of cavalry and two infantry divisions of three brigades each. 
In an infantry brigade there were four battalions. Each division also 
had units from the Royal Engineers and the Royal Artillery to support 
their operations. There were eighteen companies of the Army Service 
Corps, nine companies from the Royal Army Medical Corps (R.A.M.C.) and 
three companies from the Army Ordinance Corps providing general support 
at Aldershot. Also, there were four companies of Royal Engineers for 
communications, two Balloon companies, two Bridging Trains, and Military 
Police to round out the command. Since Aldershot was also the "home of 
the army," several schools were located there--the Balloon School, the 
School of Instruction for Mounted Infantry, School of Gymnastics, School 
of Signalling, and the Army Veterinary Schoo1. 4 
Besides his personal staff of an assistant military secretary and 
an aide-de-camp, Smith-Dorrien had his General Staff of four officers 
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and an Administrative, Technical, and Departmental Staff. This latter 
staff was headed by Major-General H.M. "Wise Bob" Lawson whose task was 
to supervise the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, the Assistant 
Quartermaster-General, the Staff Officer for the Royal Horse and Royal 
Field Artillery, the Chief Engineer, the Assistant Director of Supplies 
and Transport, the Principle Medical Officer, the Principle Veterinary 
Officer, the Assistant Director of Ordinance Stores, and the Chief 
Accountant. 
A major purpose of any staff is to assist the commander in his 
control over the units assigned to him and to see to the day-to-day 
details of administering to an army. This is no simple task if it is 
to be done effectively. Every military organization is structured to 
provide food, shelter, and clothing, albeit sometimes of doubtful 
quality, and training in time of peace, so that when the army is required 
on the battlefield it'is able to accomplish its assigned mission. 
Ultimately, the object of all this attention and the subject of 
countless different and often meaningless reports and returns that were 
required daily, weekly, monthly, or "as appropriate," was the British 
soldier. Basically, England's fighting man remained relatively unchanged 
over the centuries since Hastings. Most of Britain's great victories of 
arms were based upon the rugged durability and unflinching dependability 
of the private soldier. When wisely and gallantly led, he was capable 
of accomplishing incredulous feats. Unfortunately, "wisely" and "gallant-
ly" were often mutually exclusive terms. Britain's preference to " 
do this business with the cold iron!"--the bayonet--hints at this stead-
fastness of her soldiers and her leader~ confidence in them. 5 
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When a young man "took that fatal shilling" and became a recruit, 
a transformation process began. He would be put in a mold of discipline 
and duty filled with a cement mixed of pipeclay, bootblack, and beer. 
This mold would be set out on the drill field to cure under the watch-
ful eyes of colour-sergeants and the awesome presence of the Regimental 
Sergeant-Major. While the new soldier was forming in his mold, he 
would be imprinted by stories and unit legends told by old soliders 
about older soldiers' exploits with bayonet and bottle in battle and at 
the bar. When peer acceptance and a superior's approval lifted the 
"recruity" from his matrix, the newly minted soldier would forever carry 
his mold's stamp of duty and discipline. Next, he would be dipped 
into his regiment's unique blend of traditions and customs, many whose 
purpose and origin were so old that '~lellington' s men had forgotten them. 
Then the soldier would be buffed to a shine by the command's silken 
battle streamers which were soaked in that magic, intangible, yet real 
and all-pervasive substance called honor--regimental honor. 
While there may be a flawed casting produced by the stress of the 
procedure and revealed by a heavily inked defaulters sheet, the flaw 
often was in the raw material and not in the process, old and outdated 
as it was. Nevertheless, this system could bind the misfits to do their 
duty on the skirmish line or in the square. 
England's public opinion of the social and moral worth of her 
soldiers was in a transition period from between a feeling of disgust 
and pity to one between chilled tolerance and begrudged respect. This 
came about as a result of the comparatively large numbers of men involved 
in the Boer War and excellent and frequent press coverage of the conflict. 
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This favorable exposure of the army led to a better understanding of 
the soldier by the civilians. But old attitudes and prejudices die hard 
and signs could still be found that read, "No servants in livery, dogs, 
or soldiers admitted."6 Slowly, very slowly, soldiering was becoming a 
socially tolerable profession for a young man. 
New recruits were smaller in stature than those of previous decades 
and tended to be from the large industrial centers rather than rural 
settings. At Aldershot, the daily routine of the recruit had changed 
very little over the years. Depending on the time of the year, reveille 
was between 4:30 and 6:30A.M. If the soldier joined a cavalry unit, he 
had fifteen minutes to wash and dress before roll call for early morning 
stables. After marching down to the stables, he would air out the 
horse's bedding and groom his horse for one hour. Then the horses were 
taken to water, brought back to their stalls, and fed. He returned to 
his barracks, had breakfast, and changed from canvas overalls to ser-
vice dress for riding school that lasted until 10:30 A.M. When riding 
school was over, he took his horse back to the stables. returned to his 
barracks, and changed back into his canvas outfit and had about ten 
minutes to himself before he heard the trumpeter sound "stables." He 
went back down to his horse which he groomed until the animal was 
"passed clean'1 and then the recruit could start on his saddle and other 
horse furniture--a job, that at best, required an hour. This task was 
usually finished by dinner time (1:00 P.M.) for which one hour was 
allowed. After dinner, the soldier had to change clothes again to pre-
pare for an hour of dismounted drill with sword. V.!hen this drill ended 
at 3:00P.M., the recruit went back to his room once more; this time to 
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change into his "gymnasium outfit." After an hour at the gym, he had 
until "stables" at 5:00 P.M. to clean his sword and other items of his 
personal equipment. At the five o'clock stables parade, the orders for 
the next day were read, after which the soldiers were marched back down 
to the stables. ~~en the horses were watered, groomed, fed. and bedded 
down, the men could have tea, finish cleaning their equipment, get 
ready for tomorrow, and relax until "lights out" at 10:15 P.M. 
In the infantry--musket, bayonet, and foot drill took the place of 
stables and the infantryman's barracks was subjected to a far more 
strenuous standard of spotlessness than the cavalryman's. For the poor 
gunner, he had his artillery piece as well as the horses and harness to 
maintain and keep in immaculate condition. 7 
Nearly every aspect of the soldier's life was codified in minutest 
detail by tradition, regulation, or order. For example, below is the 
first four lines of a sixteen-line instruction on how the cloak should 
be attached to the saddle. 
The two baggage straps to be passed through the slots on 
the rear arch, then through the slots on the front arch of 
the luggage saddle, the points passing through from rear to 
front. The cloak rolled 20 inches long, to be placed on the 
center of the luggage saddle. One pair of short traces are 
then taken and the hooks at one end passed through the rings 
of the other end, the second pair are then passed through 
the first, and their ends secured.8 
Home to the soldier was his barracks--a long room with a row of 
narrow cots, eighteen inches apart, down each wall. Mattresses were 
three sections of coir (coconut fiber) stacked at the head of the bed. 
Above each cot were pegs and a shelf for each man's equipment and kit. 
By 1912, the authorities had unbent enough to allow the men to decorate 
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their areas with photographs and small pictures. To secure his personal 
belongings, each soldier was provided a small box which was kept under 
his cot. Older soldiers claimed the warmer corners of the room which 
were known as "Dumb ChUIIlllly' s. '' Standing in the center of the room 
between backless benches were two white-scrubbed tables set on black 
iron trestles. Tubs, mess pails, and tin utensils were stacked at each 
a 
end of the tables.~ 
Sanitary facilities were "outside," and the open barracks provided 
precious little privacy and practically no peace and quiet. With 
twenty to thirty men per room, the singing, talking, cursing, and snor-
ing created a considerable din which was often puntuated by the outraged 
shriek caused by a well thrown boot or the retching of a drunken comrade. 
One young soldier, when asked how he liked his first night in a cell of 
the guardhouse for some minor offense, answered, "Very well; it was the 
first quiet night I have had since I joined."10 
An all-important part of barracks life revolved around the building's 
maintenance. Floors and tables were washed and scrubbed, the table tres-
tles and benches were blackleaded, the walls were whitewashed whether 
they needed it or not, and everything was dusted again and again. ~~en 
this was done, each soldier had his own kit to keep in order and ready 
for inspection. For this "parade," every item of issue plus those that 
the man was to provide from his meager pay had a defined location in 
relation to other items, a painstakingly exact method of display, and a 
demanding standard of maintenance. Those items missing or damaged would 
be ''put down" against the soldier and he had to pay for its replacement. 
Specks of soot in the coal scuttle, buttons that did not sparkle, or 
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dust on a rifle barrel were cause for the entire kit to be re-inspected 
f h . d 11 a ter t e necessary correctlons were rna e. 
Insistance on a "smart" appearance kept otherwise idle soldiers 
occupied and tended to build individual and unit pride. This fetish 
for "spit and polish," however, often was carried to the most ridiculous 
extremes. In the more posh cavalry regiments, it was common for the 
inside of stable wheelbarrows to be scrubbed to a gleam and pitchfork 
tines polished. Brick dust and steel-link burnishers were used on all 
metal parts instead of the official standard of "free from rust and 
slightly oiled." Instead of the regulation "soft soap and oil," 
leather was ruined by repeated applications of "fake." This was a 
mysterious concoction of turpentine, heel-ball, harness composition, 
and as legend has it, the breath of old soldiers--possibly because of 
its alcohol content. "Fake and burnish" stood for endless, senseless 
labour far in excess of the original intention of maintenance, which was 
to provide for a long serviceable life of equipment in order to save 
government money. 
But it was not all work. Every soldier had time to himself and 
pursued his own pleasures. For many this meant beer at the canteen, 
and very little respect was given to the two pint per man allowance. 
This simple release had been around so long that it had almost become a 
right. In any case, the canteen was still a military establishment. 
It was long and usually had a low ceiling. In the center of the room 
was a circular bar with the "beer engines" and the remainder of the room 
contained the same trestle tables and benches as in the barracks. More 
progressive and daring unit canteens sported straight-backed wooden 
chairs. Although the canteen was spartan and rigidly uniform, it was 
usually crowded each evening. 12 
Corporals and privates with good-conduct badges or a "clean 
defaulters sheet" and desire for the more comfortable surroundings 
found in the local taverns could try to obtain a pass from their com-
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manding officer. This pass allowed them to be out between 10 P.M. and 
6 A M s ld . h . 1 . d . h 13 n. . ergeants cou stay out w1t out a pass unt1 m1 n1g t. 
The only drawback to a tankard or two at the Army and Navy, the 
Royal Exchange, the Beehive, the Royal Camp, the Red Lion, the Iron 
Duke, or any other establishment outside the gates, was that the soldier 
was required to wear his best uniform. Until March, 1907, clean service 
dress, i.e. khaki was permitted. But Smith-Dorrien's predecessor, 
Sir John French, put out the order that, "N.C.O. 's and men when walking 
out must wear review order in Aldershot Town, Lynchford Road, and 
Farnborough. . . 1!14 For many it was too much trouble to wear "Sunday 
kit," especially if one was prone to overindulge and the hazards in 
returning to the barracks posed a real threat to the appearance of the 
uniform. Privates were very careful of their best uniform because 
"sentry-go"--guard duty of two hours on guard and four hours off for a 
period of twenty-four hours, was performed in parade dress. At the 
guard mount parade, the two or three best turned-out individuals would 
be selected as orderlies which usually meant an easy time compared to 
their comrades pacing their post. At t:he ~,7orst, damaged kit would have 
to be paid for, and if it was found "dirty," the result could be charges 
before the colonel. 
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For those troopers who wanted something more refined and safer 
than the beer halls, there was the Royal Army Temperance Association. 
This organization, which was well entrenched on every army post by 
1907, maintained a room in most units. For fourpence a month, a soldier 
could avail himself of the "temperance drinks and light eatables." Of 
course, any member caught using intoxicants to excess forfeited his 
right to the room. Patrons of this upstanding establishment were 
known as "bun stranglers'' or "bun scramblers" for there were not always 
sufficient "light eatables." Since these sober soldiers avoided 
liquor they were known to be "on the tack" and also were called "tack-
wallahs." Their inebriated counterparts of the beer canteen were 
"canteen-wallahs"--wallah being a Hindustani word for a follower of a 
15 
trade. 
If a soldier wanted the quiet solace of a good book or to stay 
informed of the news, he could, for three pence a month, use the regi-
mental reading or recreation room. It, like the canteen, was furnished 
with the same iron-cornered trestle tables and benches found in the 
barracks. All newspapers were to be neatly folded and placed flush with 
the edge of the table. All the books were covered in brown paper. 
Novels by Miss Henry Wood were in demand, next were those by Charles 
Dickens, and Sir Walter Scott's books were hardly touched. Bare, white-
washed walls and the regulation coal box and grate emphasized the barren 
appearance. One observer remarked that, " ..• everything was square 
and straight, so that to take up a paper looks as if it might be con-
trary to regulations," and that the room" ... looks as if it had 
. d . lf 1' . . '11 ,l6 res1gne 1tse to 1terature aga1nst 1ts w1 . 
so 
There were advantages to staying sober, or at least half-sober, 
for the chance of being "run in" or "wheeled up" for being "dirty on 
parade" or for some other oversight of regulations or policy was 
reduced if a soldier was able to recognize and correct a possible 
shortcoming that might draw attention to himself. It did not take much 
to qualify for this extra attention from his superiors, a dirty button, 
insufficient pipeclay, or a hasty remark to the corporal usually 
qualified. 
For minor offenses the accused was brought before his immediate 
superior officer who heard the charges from the senior accuser, witness 
statements (if any), and then asked the offender what he had to say 
" ... in mitigation of his offense?" Unless the charges were trumped 
up, the wisest reply was, "Nothing, Sir." If the punishment was less 
than seven days "Confined to Barracks" (which was annotated on the 
soldier's record as C.B.), the officer could assign the punishment. 
If the charge was more serious, the regimental commander would hear 
the case on the porch of the orderly room when "office" call sounded at 
11:00 A.M. Confined to barracks, which was also known as "defaulters," 
involved doing the more unpleasant tasks of regimental life, making roll 
call at given intervals at the guard house in the afternoons and even-
ings, and drilling one hour each night in full marching order. This 
drill was known as "doing janke·rs." The bugle call for defaulters 
parade was called "Paddy Doyle"; presumably so-called after a long for-
gotten soldier who must have had to answer it often for the call to be 
named for him. 
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Really serious charges were heard by a Regimental Courts-Marital, 
which consisted of three officers from the accused's unit. It had the 
authority to reduce corporals and impose defined punishments on privates. 
A District Courts-Martial had greater powers in that they could reduce 
sergeants to the ranks. It also consisted of three officers but they 
could not be from the accused's regiment, and the president of the 
. 1 h d b 1 . . k 17 courts-martia a to e at east a maJor ~n ran . 
Not all offenders were tried according to officially recognized 
procedures. Privates, sergeants, and subalterns had their own closed 
courts-martial for their peers who violated standards of decorum. 
Often these self-policing methods were more effective than any regular 
trial as most of the sentences were not codified in the King's 
Regulations. If officers did not encourage these proceedings occasion-
ally, they at least turned a blind-eye to their existence. 
Soldiers, however, were not as concerned with punitive actions, 
official or otherwise, as they were with the quantity and quality of 
their food. Breakfast was usually served at 8:00A.M., dinner at 
1:00 P.M. and tea (''char") at 4:00 P.M. Many sergeant-majors were 
absolutely convinced that the dinner bugle and pay call were the only 
two bugle calls most soldiers ever knew. 
For more than fifty years the official ration per man per day was 
three-quarters pound of meat with bone and one pound of bread which was 
called by the Hindustani name of "ruti." Government contractors bought 
flour graded as "best seconds," Though it was not contaminated as often 
charged, the meat was of marginal quality since the contract price was 
about half of what civilians paid for meat. At times, the "with bone" 
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loophole was used to great advantage. It was part of the duty of the 
orderly officer to attend the ration issue to insure government stan-
dards were kept and fairness in distribution was maintained. Bread 
was issued each morning at about 7:30A.M., and it was to last for the 
entire day. Each morning, every company reported to their colour-
sergeant whether their dinner for that day was to be "bake," "boil," 
or "stew." Normally, breakfast was tea, part of the bread ration, 
and some kind of meat. Each soldier received a "mess" or "grocery" 
allowance of three pence per diem that was withheld from his pay. 
This allowance was used to buy butter, jam, fish, eggs, bacon, vegetables 
and everything else the soldier ate besides his issue of meat and bread. 
Dinner was the main meal of the day. Representative menus were 
barley soup, meat-pies, and potatoes on Monday; Tuesday was Irish stew 
and plain suet-pudding; and Wednesday dinners had brown curry, rice, 
potatoes, and current rolls. Occasionally, the legendary ''plum-duff" 
would appear as would the enigmatic "toad-in-the hole" and "sea-pies." 
Barrack rooms served as the dining hall, and each room sent a 
representative to the battalion cookhouse for their rations, while the 
corporal drew a large bucket of beer from the canteen. Dining accoutre-
ments were primitive--no tablecloths or napkins, tinware for plates, the 
salt was usually on a piece of paper from which one just "pinched" the 
desired amount. For his beverage, each man dipped the basin from which 
he drank his tea into the beer bucket. In addition to inspecting the 
preparation of the food at 12:40 P.M. at the cookhouse, another part of 
the orderly officer's duty was to visit each barracks during the meal 
and ask, "Any complaints?" While it was not part of any soldier's 
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nature to praise his food, rarely was any complaint registered--probably 
because they believed that the subaltern making the inquiry was incap-
able of having any effect upon that hardened monster, the cook, 
and the alleged remains of commissary mules which he called meat. 
These meals were prepared under the supervision of the regimental 
sergeant-cook, who was not necessarily a graduate of the Army School 
of Cookery. For this position he received an additional six pence each 
day. There were eight companies (approximately ninety men each) in the 
battalion and each company provided two privates as cooks. These men 
were taught the three "S's" of the cookhouse, "skim, simmer, and scour.'' 
The day for these seventeen cooks began no later than 6:30 A.M. and 
ended after dinner was prepared at 12:40 P.M. 
Tea time was observed whenever possible. Tea, which was graded as 
"good medium" Cognon from China, was mixed with sugar and milk in large 
pails and poured into the soldiers' basins. Teapots, cups and saucers 
were only found in the sergeants' mess. \.Jhat little was left from the 
morning bread ration was served with "drippings," jam, or cheese. Both 
tea and supper were optional and if he had the money, the trooper had 
his choice of buying it in the town or at the regimental coffee-bar, 
which was busiest between 7;30 and 9:30 P.}1. Prices were kept low as 
possible at the coffee-bar and three pence was usually sufficient. 
Coffee, tea, cocoa, mineral water, and lemonade were the beverage 
choices. Those soldiers both hungry and low on cash could purchase a 
snack at the "dry bar'·' or grocery that sold small items of kit, clean-
ing equipment, and food to supplement what little that was officially 
.d . 18 prov1. ea. 
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Problems of money, or more precisely, the lack of money, were a 
constant irritant to the soldier. At the bottom of the pay scale was 
the private. Rates of pay varied within the army. Below is a list of 
what privates in different branches were authorized per day. 
s. d. 
Household Cavalry 1 9 
Cavalry of the line 1 2 
Royal Horse Artillery 1 3 
Royal Field Artillery 1 2~ 
Royal Engineers 1 2 
Army Service Corps 1 2 
Infantry of the line 1 0 
An infantry line corporal drew 2s. 4d. daily and if a private was 
a good soldier, he might, after about seven years be promoted to ser-
geant and be authorized three shillings a day. However, his pockets 
rarely contained his full salary at the end of the week. To the credit 
side of the private's ledger, in addition to his daily shilling, was the 
three pence per diem "grocery allowance" (that was withheld), and a very 
small uniform upkeep allowance. Also, if applicable, a soldier in the 
infantry, cavalry, artillery, or the School of Musketry could receive 
daily proficiency pay that varied from 3d. to 6d.-
Any private with a clean record could also draw a penny per diem 
for each good-conduct badge earned. This pay could be forfeited upon 
bad conduct. A soldier's record was reviewed for the first badge after 
two years of umblemished service. At the sixth, twelfth, eighteenth, 
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twenty-third, and twenty-eighth year of service his regimental sheet was 
again checked, and if it was untarnished during the previous two years, 
19 the soldier was awarded another badge and another penny per day. 
Various deductions and "stoppages" were subtracted from his 
magnificant sum. A penny a month was paid to the company barber. This 
position was held by one of the older soldiers who was not necessarily 
trained in the tonsorial arts. For this reason, most soldiers preferred 
to patronize the local civilian barber, but they had to surrender the 
monthly penny to the company barber anyway. A half penny a day was 
deducted for washing and a penny a month went to the unit tailor for 
minor adjustments and for marking new items of equipment. Missing or 
unserviceable items revealed during an inspection were drawn from the 
regimental quartermaster and marked against the soldier's amount due. 
A subscription to the recreation or reading room for a private was 
3d. a month, a corporal was charged 4d., and a sergeant paid 6d. 
Football,cricket, or shooting club dues were also three pennies a month. 
There was always some damage done to the barracks or its contents due 
to the rowdy nature of barracks life--boots that missed their targets, 
fist fights, clumsy drunks, or vandalism. 11here individual blame was 
ascertained, those responsible had to pay for it. When this was impos-
sible, the damage charges were divided among all the occupants. This 
stoppage normally was about two pence a month but could go much higher. 
To discourage malingering, some ingenious treasury clerk developed 
a policy that would provide the government a net profit of four and one 
half pennies per day for each sick soldier. Hospital rations were 
better and were worch lOd. per diem. But whether the soldier was in the 
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hospital through his own negligence or in the line of duty, he forfeited 
his mess allowance of 3d. and the value of his meat and bread (4~d.). 
Furthermore, an additional seven pence was deducted for each day that 
h . h h . 1 20 t e trooper was 1n t e osp1ta . 
After all the accounts were settled up, there was usually little 
left from the "guaranteed" shilling a day. If this situation was hard, 
it was almost impossible for soldiers who were married "off the strength." 
Those few soldiers fortunate enough to have their marriages recognized 
by the government received free quarters and additional fuel and rations. 
An individual married outside of the regulations was treated as single 
and had to reside in the barracks unless he was in receipt of a "sleep-
ing out" pass for good conduct. Usually these men tried to obtain a 
"staff job" that paid a few pennies extra and did not require attendance 
at morning parades unless the formation was to be "as strong as 
possible."21 
But despite the hard work and low pay, the moral and attitude of 
British soldier was as high as it had ever been. Pax Britannica 
seemed secure, and the empire was at its brightest. England's soldiers 
were ready for Smith-Dorrien, and he was ready for them. It was the 
British officers who were caught unprepared by Smith-Dorrien and his 
methods. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FORGING THE BLADE 
There was very little fanfare when Smith-Dorrien formally assumed 
command of Aldershot on December 16, 1~07. He replaced Lieutenant-
General Sir John French who was selected as the new Inspector-General 
1 
of the Forces--an important and influential post. French's reputation 
was based on his inflated accomplishments during the Boer War. French 
commanded at Aldershot for over five years, and although he was ham-
pered by the early confusion and disruption in the War Office, he made 
few original contributions and had no lasting impact. Nevertheless, 
he. was a very popular officer with his peers and superiors and was a 
cavalryman in the ''knee-to-knee" tradition. He was a strong supporter 
of an aggressive, mobile cavalry--the "beau sabeur" school. French 
also believed in night operations and double-company training. He also 
tinkered ineffectively with a "striking force" organization. His motto 
2 
was "Be strong and work," All in all, if French was not particularly 
bright, at least he was capable in a routine manner and raised the com-
bat effectiveness of the army. He was egotistical and opinionated, and 
he could be a loyal friend or a bitter enemy--both to the very end. 
French was the guest of honor at a farewell dinner held by his staff. 
A newspaper reported on portions of his speech about Smith-Dorrien: 
He [French] was very fortunate in being succeeded in the 
command by an old friend and comrade with whom he had served 
in both peace and war. There was no soldier for whom he 
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possessed agreater regard or esteem, and that it was with 
the utmost confidence that he handed over the command to 
him.3 
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French would not hold this opinion of his "old friend and comrade" for 
long. Much later, one observer compared the commands for both officers: 
Perhaps the happiest period in the history of the Camp 
and Aldershot Town was the five years from 1907 until 
1912 when the G.O.C. [General Officer Commanding] was 
Lieutenant-General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien ... no one 
was really sorry when in 1907 grumpy, peppery Sir John 
Denton Pinkstone French left the Aldershot Command.4 
Since individual training was well underway and the "Government 
House,'' (the commanding general's residence) was a "shell" that required 
£3000 to make it habitable, Smith-Dorrien and his family took leave 
shortly after he assumed command. Although it was announced that he 
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would return on March 1, 1908, he was back on January 31. 
Smith-Dorrien felt that any improvement and modernization of the 
army must begin at the army's very foundation--the soldier. His exper-
iences in Malta and at Quetta only further intensified his belief that 
the "other ranks" must be encouraged to start thinking for themselves 
and to act on their own initiative instead of only responding wooden-
like to parade ground instructions. This could not be accomplished by 
scheduling more exercises and drill periods; it had to begin from within 
the soldier. To encourage this broadening of mental and moral awareness, 
the new G.O.C. took steps to reduce the many petty irritants of service 
life and to further improve the soldier's living conditions. His ideas 
and plans were not half-baked schemes. In 1901, Smith-Dorrien submitted 
a proposal entitled, "Notes for the Improvement of the Intelligence and 
Comforts of the Men," to the War Office. In it, he advocated, " .. 
really comfortable dining rooms" separate reading and recreation rooms, 
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good bathrooms, and plenty of light in the barracks. "Make them com-
fortable in barracks and they won't be driven outside and get into 
trouble, but will sit down and improve their minds."6 Regrettably, his 
plan was not acted upon then. 
Once that Smith-Dorrien had the authority, he put his words into 
action. During his term, dining halls were built and furnished with a 
more home-like decor, as were the Regimental Institutes, recreation 
rooms and canteens. In May, 1909, the king opened the Cavalry Brigade 
Club. It was a "palatial establishment ... with a separate room for 
the 'gentle sex. '" A desc.ription of the new club concluded, "there need 
be no fear that these luxurious club surroundings will convert to the 
soldier into a milksop, for the nature of his training nowadays is such 
as to more than counter-balance any social check of a softening charac-
ter which might heretofore have borne influence." 7 
On March 4, 1908, Smith-Dorrien laid the cornerstone of a building 
that would be " .. equipped with recreation rooms, coffee bar and 
other amenities"--the Smith-Dorrien Methodist Soldiers' Home. Several 
years later in October, 1911, he " ... saw a pet project" completed; a 
soldiers' club similar to the one at Quetta was finished at Borden--a 
primitive outlaying camp at Aldershot where the 3rd Brigade was billeted. 8 
Smith-Dorrien ordered the installation of better lighting in the 
barracks and more baths. Shower baths, a specialty of his chief engi-
neer (Colonel G.K. Scott-Moncrieff), were put "in any hitherto unused 
corner." Ration quality was upgraded, and the menus were varied under 
the G.O.C.'s supervision. 9 
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Sports had almost become an obsession with the army during this 
period. Smith-Dorrien felt that there was insufficient playing areas 
for football, rugby, cricket, hockey, and squash. Under his direction, 
the recreation grounds were increased by 150%. \{hen Smith-Dorrien 
inquired about the feasibility of clearing a rather large tangled 
forest, his engineers told him it would take years to cut the thicket 
down. Undeterred, he waited until his two divisions were training in 
the vicinity of the forest. He placed them along its edge and, in his 
words, had them clear '' ... such a field of fire as would cause the 
disappearance of the obnoxious trees. All went according to plan, and 
10 in six hours the trees were down." 
Smith-Dorrien's most drastic reform in improving the living con-
ditions of his men involved the soldiers patrolling Aldershot Town. 
Each night, numerous pickets, each composed of a sergeant and from four 
to six men, walked the streets, helping to keep the peace. Over 700 
men were required every week for this "irksome duty." Smith-Dorrien 
wrote, 
From long experience of the rank and file, who always play 
up if trusted, I abolished the picquets forthwith--at the 
same time publishing an order saying that I did so as I 
trusted the men to behave, but that if events proved I had 
formed too high an appreciation of the characteristics of 
the British soldier I should cancel the order.ll 
This act horrified his Provost-Marshal and many townspeople, who pre-
dieted immediate riot and ruin, for "Tommy's" penchant for "a feed 
12 five pints, and a fight" was legendary. Furthermore, Smith-Dorrien 
broke with tradition when he permitted sergeants to wear civilian 
clothes when "walking out" if they desired. 
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To almost everyone's surprise, the plan was a huge and popular 
success. In December, 1908, a newspaper reported, "The abolition of 
the town patrol by the troops of the garrison has met with the approval 
of the troops themselves, which was to be expected, for it is an irksome 
duty, but also by the civilian element and the local authorities."13 
During the autumn maneuvers of the same year, even the most progressive 
reformers questioned Smith-Dorrien's sanity when he had the following 
order published: 
The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, in view of the 
excellent discipline and good behaviour of the troops, 
places such confidence in their self-respect, and their 
espirit de corps, that he wishes to impose as few restric-
tions on them as possible. It is on this account that he 
has directed that the order prohibiting soldiers entering 
public-houses during manoeuvres to be held in abeyance. 
He wishes commanding officers to impress upon those under 
their command that this restriction is being removed because 
they are trusted to behave themselves, and not to indulge 
in excesses, and further warn them that, should this trust 
prove to be misplaced, not only will the offenders be most 
severely dealt with, but the restrictions will be reimposed 
at manoeuvres in future years.l4 
Smith-Dorrien's train of thought 
... was that, even if out of bounds, a thirsty man would 
enter a public house, and knowing he could not do so often, 
for fear of the Military Police, would drink as much as 
he could in a short space of time, and probably get roaring 
drunk, whereas if there were no restrictions, and he could 
get his glass of beer whenever he liked, no evil effects 
would result. 15 
Newspaper headlines read,"The British Soldier is a Gentleman Says 
General Smith-Dorrien." There was a cartoon of G.O.C. chopping through 
·1 f d h.l ld. · h h 1 d k hJ..·s health. 16 pl.. es o re tape w l.. e so J..ers Wl..t a os ran toasts to 
His judgement was correct in that over 30,000 soldiers were in the field 
over a period of three weeks, and there was only one arrest for drunken-
ness and that one occurred in a regimental canteen located on post. 17 
In February, 1910, a periodical wrote: 
The G.O.C. is blest with a very sanguine temperament in 
regard to human nature, and it has carried him through 
several matters where many otherwise determined leaders might 
possibly have never essayed a move. It was a bold step to do 
away with town piquets, and another to allow public-houses to 
remain 'in bounds' during manoeuvres. The fact that these 
privileges have not been seriously abused speaks well for 
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the General having made a pretty close study of human nature, 
which students of military history are occasionally reminded 
is one of the most necessary attributes in a good military 
leader.l8 
But a close study of human nature will not alter it, and no army 
was ever totally comprised of "bun stranglers" who spent evenings read-
ing the various religious tracts provided by the Army Scripture Reader. 
And, while a better class of recruits and tighter police enforcement 
caused many of the dance halls and public houses with "bedroom accornrno-
dations" to close, those soldiers desiring "other arrangements" could 
find them outside the city limits near Ash Vale. Here was a". 
community of prostitutes in shanties and tents. There was an underworld 
of unlicensed vendors of cheap liquor, thieves, gamblers and the most 
disreputable types of gypsies."19 
In all his attempts to upgrade the status of the soldier, Smith-
Dorrien remained a realist. wben he presided over the annual meeting 
of the Royal Army Temperance Association in March, 1909, he cautioned 
them, " ... that by over-encouragement of Teetotalism they had created 
in the minds of those adopting it a Pharisaical impression that they 
were better than their fellows, resulting in their holding themselves 
aloof and creating cliques detrimental to the true spirit of comradeship 
which should exist in every unit." If that statement did not irritate 
his old friend from Staff College days who was the "prime mover" in 
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the organization, his next one did, and it also horrified his wife who 
was present. Smith-Dorrien went on, " ... in my opinion Temperance, 
and not the Teetotalism, should be aimed at, though the latter was 
doubtless valuable to the weak-minded, who lacked self-control."20 
But Smith-Dorrien did not limit himself to the privates and non-
commissioned officers; he also took the officers to task, Colonel 
William Robertson, head of his General Staff and future Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff during the Great War, was a cavalry recruit at 
Aldershot in 1877. He remembered that in those days his officers " . 
. showed no interest in his personal concerns, and sometimes did not 
even know his name." And though things had improved since then, 
Robertson wrote, 
Much remained to be done and Smith-Dorrien was the man to do 
it. Full of energy himself, he expected everyone in the 
command to be equally zealous and to take his profession 
seriously. He held strongly that the utmost should be done 
for the welfare of the men and their families, and that they 
should be trusted not to abuse the increased privileges 
granted to them.21 
As with the army in general, society also was changing its attitude 
about officers. Previously an officer was considered to be " .. a 
brainless, swaggering, dissolute fellow who always tried to avoid pay-
ing his debts."22 A career as an officer was becoming increasingly 
acceptable to middle-class professionals. Nevertheless there was a 
critical problem in obtaining new officers between the Boer War and 
World War I. By 1910, this shortage was so severe that for the first 
time in thirty-five years, the required entrance exams were waived for 
about 250 candidates entering Woolwich and Sandhurst. 23 
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Primarily, the major drawback in officer recruitment was the lack 
of pay. Lord Roberts felt that better pay would " ... enable those 
d f b . h k 1124 possesse o more ra~ns t an money to rna e a career . . . . In 
1910, an infantry subaltern in a line regiment drew£96 a year, his 
captain$211, and the lieutenant-colonel earned£474. In a line 
cavalry regiment it was somewhat better--#122, 5;237, and.fS02 
respectively. Clearly, this was inadequate, for a cavalry officer 
required from S 600-700 more than his annual salary to maintain the 
standard expected of him. Initial expenses for clothing and equipment 
for the new infantry subaltern was approximately f 200 and his brother 
officer in the cavalry needed from f 600 to J. 1000 depending on how 
II II h • • 25 smart 1s reg~ment was. Consequently, only those men from the 
upper and upper-middle class could afford to be referred to as His 
Majesties "Trusty and well-beloved" friends. "What cheaper or less 
troublesome way of running an empire could there be than a professional 
army whose officers all had private incomes and whose rank-and-file 
26 
were all paupers." 
For the most part, many old attitudes were still present within 
the officer corps. Polo and hunting were considered the best training 
for good horsemanship and for developing a tactical feel for the country. 
Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery remembers that as a junior officer in 
1907, " ... it was not fashionable to study war and we were not allowed 
to talk about our profession in the Officer's Mess."27 An indicator 
of the officers' indifferent approach to their profession was that in 
the twelve years prior to World War I the German contributions to mili-
tary literature amounted to about 50%, the French wrote about 25%, and 
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the English output was only 1%. Smith-Dorrien's position on officer 
education was quite clear. Six months before he took over at Aldershot, 
he formally opened the Indian Staff College at Quetta. He said, 
"Higher training nowadays Gentlemen, is a very serious matter. The 
whole education of armies is on a higher plane and therefore the brains 
of an army must be very highly developed indeed." To be an effective 
staff officer, he believed a man had to study foreign affairs and 
modern history so that his work would be done in the correct perspective. 
Very few senior officers felt that way. 29 
Despite Wellington's alleged remark that, "there is nothing on 
earth so stupid as a gallant officer,"30 gallantry and gentlemanly 
conduct were the only two real character requirements for an officer. 31 
Smith-Dorrien intended to add technical and tactical competence through 
realistic and meaningful training. He wanted every soldier at Aldershot 
to understand the reason behind his orders. Since his days at Quetta 
his motto always was: 
It is only possible to get the best results out of troops 
if they are made to feel that they are trusted and encour-
aged to use their own intelligence and initiative, and 
that such is only possible in the field if the object in 
a Commander's mind and information as to develooments are 
frequented circulated.32 • 
Nobody ever doubted the object in Smith-Dorrien's mind, for it was 
frequently circulated. His ultimate goal was a properly trained, highly 
motivated army led by dedicated, professional officers and sergeants, 
and serviced by a highly efficient staff and supply system. Concurrent 
and complementary to his continuous efforts to upgrade the soldier and 
his environment was a training program designed to prepare the army for 
a modern war. 
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Less than three weeks after he took command Smith-Dorrien and 
Robertson were " engaged in measuring the capacity and capabilities 
of his command and in preparing an instructional plan of campaign for 
the ensuing training season."33 A famous general once told Robertson, 
Never forget that we have two armies--The War Office army 
and the Aldershot army. The first is always up to strength, 
and is organized, reorganized, and disorganized almost daily. 
The second is never up to strength, knows nothing about the 
first and remains unaffected by any of these organizing 34 
activities. It just cleans its rifle and falls in on parade. 
Aldershot's new G.O.C. saw to it that the second army would soon be 
doing more than that. A portion of one of Smith-Dorrien's training 
instructions is worth quoting for it revealed his perceptions of future 
combat: 
Modern war demands that the individual intelligence should 
be on a high plane. Battlefields now cover such extensive 
areas that control by officers is very difficult, consequently 
non-commissioned officers and even private soldiers very often 
find themselves left to their own resources: and it is only 
by being accustomed in peace training to use their common 
sense and intelligence that they are likely to be equal to their 
duties in war. 35 
If, during training exercises, the G.O.C. caught an officer or 
soldier who unnecessarily exposed himself to fire or observation, the 
unfortunate offender would be admonished " ... in very downright terms 
... and it was not forgotten by those to whom it was addressed. " 36 
Robertson w~ote, 
Having shared in much fighting in past wars, Smith-Dorrien 
was well qualified to judge the probable characteristics 
of future wars, and the importance he attached ... to the 
right use of ground, the effect of rifle and machine-gun fire, 
and the necessity for carefully training section and other 
subordinate leaders proved, in the light of the Great War, that 
his appreciation was singularly accurate.37 
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But there was a deep chasm between an accurate appreciation and an 
army able to overcome the obstacles considered by the appreciation. 
Intelligent and realistic training was the only way to bridge the 
chasm. This training had to accept the radical changes in tactics and 
doctrine required by the tremendous advances in the technology of war, 
i.e., the machine gun, airplane, barbed wire, quick-firing artillery, 
mechanization, and wireless telegraphy. 
Various training circulars, directives, and instructions competed 
for the little time left after the most elemental lessons in musketry 
and squad drill were taught. Unlimited (at least from the soldier's 
point of view) fatigues and "housekeeping" details also reduced train-
ing time. Coal had to be carted, rations drawn, grass picked off the 
drill field, and government property maintained. In order to make 
maximum use of what little time was left, the War Office established an 
annual training cycle that was broken down into four separate phases 
of increasingly complex training. 
The most elementary period occurred between the last two weeks of 
September and the end of February. This was the time for "individual 
training." Any shortcomings revealed in the autumn maneuvers were cor-
rected, and the majority of musketry practice and qualification took 
place. While the new recruits were under the tutelage of several old 
soldiers, the green subalterns were collected and a senior officer gave 
them ". small schemes with imaginary troops ." to work on. Each 
officer had five to ten minutes to complete his "appreciation of the 
situation" and hand it back to the instructor for a general discussion 
d . . 38 an cr1.t1.que. This time of year was also the "trooping season"; all 
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unit change of stations, drafts for overseas replacements, and unit 
rotations to the colonies were scheduled for the winter. Also, all of 
the equipment used during the maneuvers had to be brought back to its 
previous pristine condition. 
Furthermore, this was also the "furlough season," and large num-
bers of all ranks were absent. An individual training phase was a good 
idea, but its maximum effectiveness would only occur if the new 
recruits started the cylce at its beginning. This was not the case in 
the British army since recruits " ... dribbled in all year .. " 
Secondly, most regiments were understrength to begin with so two 
companies were often combined together for field exercises. This 
double-company system had a serious drawback in that neither the 
officers nor soldiers knew each other. 39 Smith-Dorrien's emphasis on 
"keeping your men informed" must have had some impact for as one observer 
noted in the spring of 1908, "the winter training has been regarded more 
agreeable also by reason of the fact that the soldier has been taken 
into the confidence of his superiors and informed on the why and where-
fore of everything."40 
Starting in March and lasting until the end of April was the phase 
of "collective training" allocated to company, battery, and squadron 
commanders to train their men to work as a team. Part of this phase 
was a program adopted by Sir John French and continued by Smith-Dorrien 
called "On Your Own" training. Under this program, the commander of a 
double-company had to take his unit at least sixteen miles away from 
Aldershot and train his men there for five days. A company commander 
had complete freedom and was totally responsible for transportation, 
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messing, and billeting of the men. He received£ 50 to cover these 
expenses. This was to have a" ... broadening effect on their mental 
horizon, besides quickening facilities in administrative directions 
hitherto blunted by absence of motive."41 This was a popular scheme 
with both officers and troops for it provided a pleasant break from 
normal routine, new scenery, and snug barns for shelter instead of 
leaky, cold tents for the weather in Hampshire at this season was truly 
miserable. An additional benefit to the program was that the "common 
citizen" obtained a first-hand impression of the soldier which helped 
to eliminate fears and misconceptions common during the earlier times 
of press gangs and forced billeting. Part of this appreciation was 
probably due to the~SO spent on the local economy. 
May and June belonged to battalion commanders, and the exercises 
became more complex as the men practised tactical operations on a larger 
scale. This phase of "collective training," and the next one in July 
and August for brigade and division commanders, provided more training 
to the officers than it did to the men. Reports of the previous year's 
maneuvers were dusted off, and weak points were addressed. All of this 
led up to the final culmination--the Annual or Autumn or Army Maneuvers 
which usually took place in late September after all the crops were in 
so that the claims from local landowners for "maneuver damage" would 
be minimal. Upon the conclusion of the maneuvers and when the last unit 
dragged into Aldershot and the men flopped onto their cots, the entire 
cycle would begin again. Meanwhile the War Office was studying all the 
reports, marking areas that needed additional work, and preparing the 
training instructions to the combat arms for the next year. The purpose 
72 
of the training cycle and army-wide instructions was to provide a basis 
for uniform training where theoretically every unit would be at the 
same combat capacity. 
Surprisingly, these formalizations of training doctrine at the War 
Office level were a recent development. Field-Marshal Sir Garnet 
Wolseley's Soldier's Pocket Book first appeared in 1869. It was updated 
over the years but it remained unofficial. In 1906, the War Office 
published 100 copies of an experimental Field Service Pocket Book. In 
the next year they enlarged it from 166 pages to 190 pages, and it was 
printed as the Field Service Pocket Book 1907, (Provisional). In 1908, 
it was expanded to 204 pages and renamed the Field Service Boo~ 1908. 
Finally, in 1909, the Field Service Regulations, Part I - Operations -
1909 was issued and it presented no real surprises. But the Part II -
Administration, however, upset the Adjutant-General and the Quarter-
42 
master-General. 
For the most part these training regulations and instructions were 
sound, but in several areas they flirted with false doctrine, especially 
where technology had any influence. On the question of entrenchment, 
a concept that ancient warriors appreciated, there seemed to be a near 
universal opinion that it was a bad habit. "Materially and morally, 
protection is best obtained by the most vigorous action. To dig one-
self in diminishes the intensity of one's fire and depresses the offen-
sive spirit."43 If regulars were taught to use the spade it would 
create " ... a defensive-minded mentality which would sap them of their 
morale, deprive them of their spirit of aggression ... and render them 
incapable of manoeuvring courageously and competently .... "44 
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No officer, including Smith-Dorrien, foresaw the extent of the 
trench warfare just a few years ahead, but neither did Smith-Dorrien 
accept the ideas expressed above. He knew that entrenching to some 
degree was a necessity for survival against modern rifles and machine 
guns, especially if the natural terrain provided little cover. Smith-
Dorrien ordered that the 
. . . troops should be continually practised in improvising 
existing cover . . . . Officers and non-commissioned offi-
cers should be trained to sight and trace trenches after 
dark as well as by day. Artillery, too, is very dependent 
on the hours of darkness in getting into position, and al-
though it may as a rule be possible to select positions 
during the day, it must frequently happen that the actual 
digging in of guo pits, and moving guns into them must take 
place at night.4) 
Before he left, his two divisions knew how to dig trenches. 
Smith-Dorrien may even have convinced them of its value, for in February, 
1909, the Aldershot column in the Naval and Militarv Record reported that 
trenching " was regarded as a sort of hang-dog fatigue work loses 
its horrors, and maybe cross-country racing and even football will yet 
give away to it in popularity as a competition! But not yet!" 46 
Smith-Dorrien also convinced the War Office to discard the current 
entrenching tool--the Wallace spade which was a "positive torment,"--
and to addopt a new design which every man (including sergeants) was to 
d h . 47 carry, as oppose to every ot er pr1vate. From the soldiers' exper-
iences, the best idea was to discard all entrenching tools. 
Another project of Sir Horace's was upgrading the army's machine 
gun. He wanted the improved Vickers model to replace the ancient Maxim 
but could not convince the War Office to finance the project. 48 He 
went to the School of Musketry at Hythe to learn all about machine guns 
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and how to best employ them but machine gun doctrine was yet to be 
established. Some felt it should be treated as artillery. Smith-
Dorrien was not convinced that was correct. He felt that each battalion 
should control the two weapons allotted to them unless there was a 
special situation such as a critical assault or an exposed position 
that required the weapons to be "brigaded" at the crucial point. 
Over the years of his command, he had his subordinates experiment with 
various tactical applications of the fire power provided by the machine 
h k h . . d 49 gun; e ept ~s m~n open. 
Sir Horace also paid particular attention to a more traditional 
weapon--the rifle. Britain's Lee-Enfield was perhaps the finest rifle 
in the world. 50 While nearly every general talked about improving 
marksmanship, Smith-Dorrien was one of the few who actually accomplished 
it. Because of the War Office's legendary parsimony, it was a wonder 
that the men even remembered how to fire their weapons. Each year, the 
infantry and the cavalry were allocated 250 rounds per man, engineers 
received 100 and the artillerymen fired forty. Those soldiers attending 
the machine gun course at Hythe received a paltry 310 rounds, and those 
who the instructors judged as proficient did not fire any, thereby 
. h . . 51 sav~ng t e ammun~t~on. Most of the allocation was fired at the annual 
qualification course, and the trooper went to the ranges " 
same spirit as the convicts on the treadmill."52 
. in the 
Recruits were given eight days of preliminary practice or "dry 
firing," and then they went to the range and fired sixteen cycles of 
seven rounds each at ranges from 200 to 800 yards in various positions 
(standing, kneeling, and prone). Next were four "rapid" individual 
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practices, and seven attempts at volley firing. Total allowed--189 
rounds, and poor shots had eleven additional bullets to make them experts. 
Refresher training consisted of eight "dry" drills during the year 
on aiming and fire discipline and eight tries at distance judging. Just 
prior to the "live firing" on Ash Range, there were two additional days 
of "preliminary drill." On the range each soldier had forty-two rounds 
allotted for "deliberate individual" at ranges of 200-800 yards; fifty-
six rounds were to be fired as "volley and independent," and twenty 
rounds were allotted to "attack practice." A commander had another 
. h d f. . f h. h . 53 e~g ty-one roun s per man to ~re ~n any area o ~s c o~ce. 
Targets were of the "bull's eye" variety and posted at known ranges. 
This was patently unrealistic, and in September, 1908, Sir Horace spoke 
about musketry and summarized his opinions: "First, that the old bull's 
eye shooting was unnecessary to make men serviceable; secondly more 
practice was required in loading the rifle for quick firing and to get 
the best results; and thirdly, judging distance must not be lost sight 
of, for under service conditions it was impossible to hit without prac-
tice in judging distance." He wanted commanders to use the time during 
inclement weather in the winter when the troopers were forced to stay 
indoors to practice snap shooting, quick loading, aiming, and firing 
54 behind cover. Competition was used as an incentive for soldiers to 
improve their firing skills and each unit had a champion. 
King of all marksmanship contests was the Annual Rifle Association 
Meeting which usually had over 11,000 applicants competing for prizes 
worth j.l, 250 (usually silver spoons). \Vith Smith-Dorrien' s support, 
the bull's eye was dropped from this contest and the new service target 
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was introduced. This target's upper portion was white to represent the 
sky, and the lower part was "dull mud-coloured." A black pattern in 
the shape of a man's head and shoulders was in the brown portion, with 
the "head" partly into the white. Any shots in the black were scored 
as bull'eyes and those in the brown were "hits."55 Smith-Dorrien made 
his range present as realistic targets as possible. It had features 
that the U.S. Army in 1979 did not process. It contained " ... every 
sort of appearing and disappearing targets, such as infantry digging a 
trench, guns galloping into action, cavalry charging towards the 
attacker .•.. " These targets were set up on a small gauge railway 
which operators ran from behind a protective mound. Sir Horace made 
this range part of the annual course, and he presented a challenge cup 
h . . 56 to t e w1nn1ng team. 
To encourage practice in judging distance, Smith-Dorrien estab-
lished a contest. Teams of twelve, four each of officers, N.C.O.'s, 
and privates, observed scouts firing blanks. Officers were permitted 
to use field glasses for the maximum range was 2000 yards, and the 
other ranks used the naked eye up to 1200 yards. Each team was allowed 
two minutes to find the enemy, judge the distance, and set their sights 
on their rifles. For a correct range, a team received four points, and 
each fifty yard error was a loss of one point. In August, 1908, the 
Gordon Highlanders won first place, the prize cup, and 512 with a score 
of 124 points. 57 
Upon reviewing the musketry returns for his command, Smith-Dorrien 
wrote: 
I was therefore, not at all pleased to find that the Cavalry 
Brigade at Aldershot were low down in the annual musketry 
courses. . . . So on 21st August, 1909, ordering all cavalry 
officers to meet me at the 16th Lancer's Mess, I gave them 
my views pretty clearly, with the result that ... the 
improvement in musketry was so marked that the cavalry went 
nearly to the head of the lists in the Annual Musketry. I 
submit that my action was justified by what happened in 
the Great War, but at the time I am aware that my attitude 
was resented.58 
77 
Improper doctrine and tactics would negate any marksmanship skill 
Smith-Dorrien introduced. Authorities were divided on the proper 
battlefield procedures to follow. Conclusions from the French and 
German maneuvers conflicted with their own doctrine. "Attack, attack, 
always attack," seemed to be the majority view. Statements like, "We 
must harden our hearts, as our forefathers of old, to the heavy losses 
that will occur . . . a steady advance of strong disciplined and brave 
men, prepared to suffer losses, to use their bayonets with effect . 
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were common. Some generals wanted to attack from a position 600 
d f h b . . 60 yar s rom t e o Ject~ve. Others, probably mindful of the weight of 
the soldier's kit and his chance of surviving a 600 yard assault 
against machine guns, artillery, and a protected and determined foe, 
61 
opted for a more conservative 200 yard charge. 
" 
Official experts in the War Office (Director of Staff Studies) gave 
little help. Uncertain whether French, German, or home-grown doctrine 
provided the true path to victory, they toyed with "the doctrine of no 
doctrine." The Memorandum on Army Training, 1910 was rather vague and 
illustrated this doctrine of no doctrine: "Success depends not so much 
on the inherent soundness of a principle or plan of operations as on 
the method of application of the principle and the resolution with which 
the plan is carried out,"--an example of fence straddling at its finest. 62 
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Not all generals were as foggy-headed. Major-General Charles Monro 
advocated an assault at the "quick time" until enemy fire forced your 
forces to advance by alternate sections. If the enemy's fire became 
more effective, the line would continue to advance by individual rushes. 
At all times, those soldiers not moving were to keep a covering fire 
f h d . 63 or t ose a vanc1ng. Smith-Dorrien felt that the established exten-
sion for the assaulting line was adequate but wanted the forward 
sections to wait for the following lines to reach the last firing posi-
tion before the final assault, as opposed to piecemeal attempts by 
. 1' 64 success1ve 1nes. 
Discussions of battlefield maneuvers were not limited to the 
infantry. There grew, from an analysis of recent tactical operations, 
an awareness of the importance of a true combined arms team, i.e. a 
close and continuous cooperation between the cavalry, the infantry, and 
the artillery. This cooperation was absolutely imperative between the 
latter two arms. 
Actually, the mission of the artillery had changed very little 
over the decades. On the offence, it was to shell the objective, reduce 
the enemy, and weaken his resistance. On the defence, it was to inflict 
as much damage as possible before the enemy approached within small-
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arms range. Impressive technical advancements in the quick-firing 
gun and smokeless powder, lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, and the 
extensive French artillery tests and maneuvers contributed to the 
general tactical confusion on how to maximize the potential of the 
artillery. 
Smith-Dorrien's only contribution to preparing the artillery for 
the next war was to insist that the batteries fire from concealed 
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positions and that they were to be dug-in whenever possible. He under-
stood the jealousies and the parochial opinions of each branch. In 
order to foster understanding between the two arms, artillery officers 
exchanged positions with their brother infantry officers for short 
periods of time. On exercises, he insisted that each unit fully under-
stand their mission in relation to the overall scheme and how they each 
complement the other. 
Lord Roberts, a gunner of the old school, was the only officer at 
the highest echelons who believed that artillery had become the decisive 
force on the battlefield, but his was definitely a minority opinion. 66 
Many artillery officers still dreamed of unlimbering from the charge at 
point blank range and shredding the enemy into ruins with several 
crashing volleys. 
Despite their discussions of bayonet charges and their longing 
for the chance to fire double-grape at fifty yards, nothing infantry-
men or artillerymen debated ever reached the furor and bitterness of 
the "cavalry controversy" concerning mounted tactics. Cavalry regiments 
in general, and cavalry officers in particular, were very jealous of 
their special position as the distilled essence of chivalry and gallan-
try. No other British uniform could compete with that of the cavalry 
in its martial splendor and its ability to catch a lady's eye. Pennant-
tipped lances, the jingle of sabres and saddle rings, and the earthy 
aroma of horse sweat and saddlesoap were far more romantic than hob-
nailed ammunition boots, an eight-pound rifle, and dull khaki. 
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Cavalry knew deep in their haughty souls, that as the true descen-
dants of the knights of King Arthur's Round table, they were indeed 
the keepers of the flame. The bugle call that sounded the charge of 
the Light Brigade was identical to the one heard by the 17th Lancers 
of Omdurman in 1898. In his dreams, each eager young subaltern heard 
echoes of those bugles as he reaped his harvest of glory in bloody 
battles on future fields of valor. Elite of the elite was, and is, 
the Household Cavalry. Members of this unit believed that they were 
far superior to the troopers in the line regiments, who in turn, 
despised the Household cavalrymen for being too soft. Dragoon Guards-
men thought that they were far superior to mere Dragoon, and both 
thought it a horrible disgrace to be a Lancer. And ncne of the three 
would consider service as a Hussar. At the same time, a Hussar knew 
that all the others were too big and bulky and that he was the only 
true cavalryman. Despite their differences, however, all cavalrymen 
pitied the poor "beetle crunchers"--the infantry. 67 But the more 
learned soldiers in the infantry knew a poem by Lindsay Gordon which 
read in part: 
So the coward will dare on a gallant horse 
Hhat he never would dare alone 
Because he exults in a borrowed force 
And a hardihood not his own.68 
Roots of the cavalry controversy were found in the spirited argu-
ments over whether the lance or sword was the most efficient weapon. 
It was easier to reach dismounted men with the lance, but it took over 
three years of practise before a trooper was really competent in its 
use. Although the sword was easier to master, it also had several dis-
advantages; it was bulky, heavy, and after several swings most men's 
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wrists and arms were too fatigued for them to be very effective. 69 But 
there was not any real problem since both weapons were used astride a 
noble steed and not afoot like ignoble infantry. 
It took the introduction of a rapid fire rifle to accelerate the 
debate and split the cavalry corps. Some modern, professional officers 
started to study the relationships between fire power and shock action. 
Historical examples were trotted forth to prove or disprove the advan-
tages of sword or lance or rifle. America's Civil War was rated as 
a draw--both firepower and dismounted action were employed as well as 
the more traditional shock action of a massed cavalry charge. It was 
believed that more shock action was used in the Franco-Prussian war than 
fire power, and both sides claimed the Boer War vindicated their 
positions. 70 In May, 1900, there was an action near the Zan.d River 
where the cavalry half-heartedly pursued the withdrawing Boers. Major-
General Sir Ian Hamilton described the cavalry's action as a "fiasco," 
where as Major-General Sir John French thought it was a 11 
triumph for the moral force of cold steel. 1171 
. splendid 
Most anti-cavalry reformers felt the Boer War was atypical and 
therefore did not prove anything. These officers were disgusted with 
the use of mounted infantry and argued that these impromptu units were 
worthless. Major Douglas Haig, a cavalry officer and a future comman-
der of the British Army in France, wrote that mounted infantry 11 
can't ride and know nothing about their duties as mounted men. Robert's 
Horse and Kitchener's Horse are only good for looting, and the greater 
part of them disappear the moment a shot is fired or there is a prospect 
of a fight. 1172 Lord Kitchener wrote to Lord Roberts, (they shared the 
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same opinion about cavalry), that the beau sabres should" ... seize 
and hold positions by rifle fire and therefore assist the general 
scheme ... instead of wondering sometimes aimlessly, seeking for the 
enemy's cavalry in order to charge them as their only role in war." 73 
There were other suggestions; one cavalry tactitian wanted the cavalry 
to have more machine guns for firepower, let the troopers keep their 
swords, and issue revolvers instead of rifles. Another attempt at 
compromise was an idea to have a sword attached to the end of the rifle, 
thereby creating a lance. It did not work because of poor balance and 
h . 74 t rust~ng power. Lord Roberts, a crusty campaigner if there ever was 
one, fired twenty-one senior officers, including eleven of the seventeen 
cavalry leaders, for incompetence during the first eleven months in the 
Boer War. 75 This added to his reputation as a cavalry reformer. As 
Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, he pushed his views on the 
cavalry and in an Army Order in 1903 made it official: 
II It [the lance] will only be carried on escort duty, at 
reviews and at other ceremonial parades; not on guard, in the field, at 
manoeuvres, or on active service." Roberts wanted no room for doubt in 
the last paragraph, "In issuing these instructions, the Commander-in-
Chief desires to impress upon all ranks that although the cavalry are 
armed with the carbine (or rifle) and sword, the carbine (or rifle) will 
henceforth be considered as the Cavalry soldier's principal weapon."76 
This instruction sat as well on the cavalry's self-image as a commis-
sariat mule's pack saddle did on the colonel's favorite polo pony. 
Battle lines were drawn on this issue, and the overwhelming major-
ity were behind the purists led by Lieutenant-General Sir John French, 
Major-General Sir Douglas Haig, Brigadier-General M.F. Rimmington and 
Major-General H.J. Scobell. A small handful of reformers collected 
around Lord Roberts, Lord Kitchener, Smith-Dorrien, Sir Ian Hamilton 
and the Earl of Dundonald--the only cavalry officer was the Ear1. 77 
In 1906, the lance was dropped from escort duty and ceremonial 
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parades; victory seemed complete for the reformers. However, Roberts' 
opponents bided their time and kept up steady pressure from all sides. 
Cavalry Training 1907, a War Office publication sponsored by Major-
General Sir Douglas Haig, demonstrated the nature of their resistance. 
It must be accepted as principle that the rifle, 
effective as it is, cannot replace the effect pro-
duced by the speed of the horse, the magnetism of 
the charge and the terror of cold steel. For when 
opportunities for mounted action occur, these 
characteristics combine to inspire dash, enthusiasm 
and moral asc7gdency that cavalry is rendered 
irresistable. 
Now the conflict was in official doctrine. Roberts and his supporters 
intended to couple firepower with the inherent capability of the 
cavalry's mobility. They wanted the cavalry to use their rifles to 
create a situation that could be exploited by shock action and swords. 
Scouting, screening and threatening the enemy's flanks and rear had 
. . 11 1 79 pr1or1ty over a e se. "True" cavalry officers viewed anything 
other than a "charge a la Scot's Grays at Waterloo" as blasphemy and 
attempts at reform as doctrinal emasculation. 
While Roberts won the opening round by eliminating the lance, his 
opponents counter attacked and convinced the War Office to appoint a 
committee to develop a better sword. Chairman of this committee was 
Sir John French, who was assisted by none other than Haig, Rimmington, 
80 Scobell and a champion swordsman, Captain A. Hutton. 
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Their design was issued in 1908, and was based on the more effec-
tive thrust than on the more instinctive method of "slash and hack." 
However, the steel scabbard was continued instead of a leather-covered 
wooden one. Besides being shiny and noisy, the steel sheath dulled the 
blade very quickly, although some quality steel scabbards did have a 
wooden lining. 
Personalities soon became involved in the dispute. Cavalrymen 
refused to yield their cherished charges to grubby dismounted action 
and labelled the reformers as anti-cavalry. When Roberts was eased out 
of office in 1904, his party's power waned as French's waxed. 
Ian Hamilton was probably the most hard-line reformer. As an 
observer to the Russo-Japanese ~Jar, he sent a dispatch home on the 
Battle of Liao Yang concerning the use of cavalry, in which he observed 
that " the only thing the cavalry could do in the face of machine 
guns was to cook rice for their own infantry If Later he wrote, 
"For my part I maintain it would be more reasonable to introduce the 
elephants of Porus on to a modern battlefield as regiments of lancers 
and dragoons ,.81 French felt " ... that dismounted action 
would tend to take the edge off their cavalry's dash ... '', supported 
massed charges, and believed that the sword and not the rifle was the 
82 true weapon of the cavalry. Furthermore, he thought that the cavalry 
could spring upon the enemy before they could bring their weapons to 
bear and thus allowing the horsemen to destroy them with the sword. 83 
Smith-Dorrien's views generally followed those of the other 
reformers; he wanted the cavalry for bold, fast reconnaissance, 
tenacious screening operations, and wide turning movements. When his 
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troopers made contact with the enemy, however, they were to dismount and 
use their Enfields. After two years at Aldershot, Sir Horace was irri-
tated to find that the cavalry " on field days and manoeuvres, 
hardly ever dismounted, but delivered perfectly carried out, though 
impossible, knee-to-knee charges against infantry."84 This glaring 
failure to face reality was also part of his musketry lecture to the 
assembled cavalry officers at the 17th Lancer's Mess in August, 1909. 
It was a typical British understatement when he wrote that he gave them 
his views pretty clearly and that he was aware that his attitude was 
resented. In actuality, Sir Horace had a truly spectacular temper, and 
most of the old line cavalry officers were close to mutiny afterwards. 
There was little they could do however besides have the last word--"Yes 
Sir!" 
Smith-Dorrien's newest plans to "wreck" the cavalry soon found 
their way back to Sir John French who added them to his growing list of 
scores to even up. And by 1909, the list on Smith-Dorrien must have 
filled several pages. Hardly was the ink dry on Sir John's very cordial 
letter of welcome than he began to marshal his forces against Smith-
Dorrien. 
French's "progressive" tactics were threatened by Sir Horace's 
"irresponsible" ideas about dismounted action, trenches, and marksman-
ship. Smith-Dorrien had hardly unpacked when in January, 1908, just 
one month after he assumed command, he was invited to a dinner--a very 
special dinner. Rumors were whispered in War Office corridors that Sir 
Horace had "aged prematurely" and was not fit to command. Also, French 
had complained to Haldane about Sir Horace's dangerous activities. 
86 
As a consequence, this dinner at the Carleton was arranged. Smith-
Dorrien was on trial--but he did not know it. French, and Sir Frederick 
Maurice were present, and Lord Esher (author of the Esher Report) was 
to be Sir Horace's informal judge. Esher left his impression of the 
meal in his journal: "The dinner was given in order to see whether 
Smith-Dorrien had changed and weakened as some maintained. He spoke 
very well on Indian subjects, and seemed a very reasonable, clear-
85 headed man." Smith-Dorrien was exonerated, and the secret trial was 
over. 
On May 18, 1908, King Edward VII, Queen Alexandria, and the 
Prince and Princess of Wales arrived to observe a field day and watched 
a well-executed, modern, tactical exercise that was marred at the very 
end by a cavalry charge against dug-in infantry. Smith-Dorrien de-
nounced the charge as "light brigade" tactics and the King agreed with 
him. Sir John, in attendance to the Royal Party, took the criticism as 
a personal insult and a public affront. Nor was his ego soothed when 
The Illustrated London News called the exercise " the most realis-
tic sham fight that has ever been organized . . ,86 Thus the seeds 
of animosity were planted by Sir John--seeds whose insidious tendrils 
bore for Smith-Dorrien a tragic fruit which ended his active career 
seven years later. 
French made no effort to conceal his displeasure with Sir Horace. 
Sir John demonstrated this by the fact that he never voluntarily visited 
Aldershot again as long as Smith-Dorrien was the G.O.c. 87 If that 
illustrated a certain childish petulance, French also showed a streak 
of cowardice and vindictiveness by ruining the careers of innocent 
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officers to strike back at Smith-Dorrien. As commander of Aldershot, 
Sir Horace was a member of the promotion board for officers up to major-
general. Since Sir John was the president, any nomination put forth by 
Smith-Dorrien received French's veto and the kiss of death for the 
officer's career. When other board members warned Sir Horace that 
French was doing this, it was a testimony to Smith-Dorrien's integrity 
that he did not believe it, because no British officer could do such a 
thing. Unfortunately for some officers, SirJohncould and did. Sir 
Horace kept on submitting names to French instead of having another 
member do it for him. 88 
While Sir Horace led his cavalry to the water trough of battle-
field reality and made them begrudingly drink from it, the purists had 
consolidated their power. Haig, after one year as Director of Military 
Training (1906) stepped into the position that established tactical 
doctrine--The Director of Staff Duties. He held this crucial post from 
1907-1909 before accepting the position of Chief of Staff of the Indian 
Army. Sir John French was the Inspector General of the Forces until he 
replaced Field-Marshal Lord Nicholson as Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff. So, with several influential posts securely in the hands of 
traditionalists, they began to erode the reforms thus far accomplished. 
In June, 1909, the lance was restored for use " ... not only on escort 
duty and at reviews ... but also on guard duty, during training, at 
manoeuvres, and when so ordered on field service."89 
In reviewing cavalry training in 1910, the Army Council gave high 
marks for the cavalry's reconnaissance skills but admonished that, 
" ... there is a lack of cohesion in the charge, and the squadron opens 
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out instead of closing in . . . . Lances and swords are not brought to 
the 'engage' with their points ready for the thrust ... the tendency 
to extend the front unduly, the lack of depth in attack formations, and 
the want of driving power of the decisive point have been again notice-
able this year."90 In 1910, musketry and reconnaissance each comprised 
ten percent of the cavalry's training. Colonel H. De Lisle, a renegade 
cavalryman, thought that reconnaissance required forty percent and that 
91 the other two areas should divide the remaining time equally. 
There was never enough time for all the training that all the 
officers in the chain of command wanted. Each commander led a personal 
crusade for some aspect of training. To counter this encroachment on 
available time, many company level leaders often posted sentinels to 
warn of approaching high ranking visitors who came to "have a look 
about." One miserable captain had the brigadier on the General Staff, 
the Division Commander, the colonel on the General Staff, his brigadier, 
and his own colonel inspect his unit's activities. Everyone but his own 
commander provided him with "valuable advice" on how to train the 
ld . 92 so ~er. Smith-Dorrien understood the inverse relationship between 
available time and one's position in any organizational hierarchy. He 
reminded his subordinates that, " ... the time available for squadron, 
battery and company collective training is, for several unavoidable 
reasons, sufficiently limited already, and generals and C.O. 's [Command-
ing Officer's] should insure that it is not further restricted ,93 
In addition to being conscious of the limited time available for 
training, he insured that the time was used wisely toward the goal of 
realism. Little escaped Sir Horace's scrunity. For example, many units 
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road-marched to various training areas from barracks and camps and back 
again. It was common for these columns to put out flank guards to 
accustom the men to being conscious of march security. Smith-Dorrien 
stopped this apparently reasonable practise. Since there were not any 
soldiers acting as the enemy, the flank guards just ambled along. This, 
he felt, encouraged bad habits and was worse than not having the guards 
out at all. Guards were to be employed only if there was a real threat 
f f " " k h . 1 94 rom some type o enemy to eep t e securlty a ert. 
Smith-Dorrien's various staff positions enabled him to review the 
army as a complete entity and not just as the sum of its component 
parts--parts he knew extraordinarily well. He understood the subtle 
and the not-so-subtle relationships and quickly spotted any potential 
weaknesses. An example of this involved medical personnel. On most 
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exercises and maneuvers, medical orderlies were provided to handle 
anticipated casualties from heat exhaustion, sickness, etc. Therefore, 
the evacuation and hospitalization procedures were never tested for 
realistic numbers of casualties expected in combat. Additionally, 
Smith-Dorrien was the first one to have senior members of the Royal 
Army Medical Corps participate on the staff rides so that they would be 
more aware of the overall plan and have the opportunity to provide input 
into decisions affecting their envisioned operations. 96 
Yet another illustration involved officer education. In March, 
1911, he organized an Intelligence and Reconnaissance Course for officers 
which was hailed as " ... another instance of the farsightedness of Sir 
Horace Smith-Dorrien."97 He encouraged his officers in their profession-
al studies and was a strong supporter of the Aldershot Military Society, 
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an organization of officers who sponsored lectures on various aspects 
f h . f . 98 o t e~r pro ess~on. For the winter of 1911/12, he ordered that the 
Russo-Japanese War be studied by the officers for clues about the condi-
99 tions of the next war. 
All of this emphasis on preparation for the next war had an adverse 
effect on the more traditional drill-field skills. It was noticed that 
for the King's Birthday Parade on May 27, 1911, the lines were not pro-
perly dressed and some units broke step when the band changed music. 
But the guess was that Smith-Dorrien " ... would rather see smart work 
in the field than faultless parades and slackness in practical 
soldiering . 11100 
In reality, war was the only real test of an army's training prac-
tises, doctrine, and tactics. Most military organizations changed as 
the result of poor performance in a previous war. Any corrections to 
existing procedures were inspired from that fount of genius--hindsight. 
It was a case of a reaction to a situation instead of the far more 
difficult process of anticipation. Rarely did nations arrange wars to 
test their battle preparedness. Instead maneuvers were used as a 
substitute. 
Maneuvers have been used by commanders " ..• to practise in peace 
what they would never attempt in war." Were maneuvers a " ... near 
image of war without its guilt," or a "burlesque of battle enshrined 
with gilt. . "? 101 All too often the latter description was uncomfort-
ably accurate. 
England first held modern annual maneuvers in 1872. Previously, 
field days were organized, but they were really large ceremonies. 
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Annual maneuvers in the 1880's and 90's were valuable to the commanders 
and their primitive staffs, but the soldiers received little practical 
instruction. All that the troopers did, recalled one private was to 
" ... march, put up tents, pull down tents, clean equipment and go 
hungry."102 Cease-fire sounded at dusk, and "enemy" officers were en-
tertained at their opponents' mess. Occasionally, "the troops had 
become so keen that some very realistic scenes occurred before the 
'100 yard order' was issued."103 This order forbade soldiers from 
opposing sides to approach within 100 yards of each other. Presumably 
this was to keep the men out of rifle butt, entrenching tool, and rock 
throwing range. 
After the Boer War, the autumn maneuvers strove for more realism. 
One of the major artificial constraints that would never be solved was 
the lack of available ground--new areas, where every road, path, hill 
and thicket was not known by heart. Once an area was tentatively 
selected every owner, tenant, and sub-tenant had to be contacted and 
their approval to use their land was obtained. To do this required 
months of correspondence with hundreds of people and many personal 
interviews, and yet the land owner would change his mind at the last 
moment. Often there were restrictions on the use of the land. Any 
area declared a "garden" or "pleasure ground" was off-limits. Fre-
quently, these places were of tactical importance and thereby created 
ludicrous situations. Often a force that was advancing "on-line" 
would have to move into a column and march down a road that ran through 
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a posted area. 
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After an area had been negotiated, the Manoeuvres Act of 1897 
provided that a Manoeuvres Commission would be appointed by the Councils 
of the Counties and boroughs involved. It was the commission's job to 
work with the military in the selection of road's, campsites and water 
sources. Next, compensation officers were selected and posters were 
distributed, warning animal owners to keep their stock penned up. 
Finally, a staff ride was conducted in the area so that preliminary 
105 plans could be made prior to the arrival of any troops. 
Naturally there were claims for damage done by the soldiers; many 
were just, others were not. One man wanted one day's wages for his two 
farm hands. When questioned about the military's responsibility, he 
1 . d h h. h d d k . . . h h ld . 106 rep ~e t at ~s men a stoppe wor to v~s~t w~t t e so ~ers. 
Civilians on a holiday and out to watch the great battles often 
interferred with operations. A piece of advice was that if you". 
should become aware of straw hats and tailormade skirts converging 
mysteriously towards any given point in motor cars or Raleigh carts 
. to follow them . for they, the daughters of the great, have 
had 'the tip' and will lead you to the scene of the death-ride of many 
107 horse-men." 
All of the foregoing problems were insignificant when compared 
with the eternal problem of determining who won a particular engage-
ment, how many casualties each side received, and what should the appro-
priate results be. Obviously, if the soldiers fired live ammunition, 
it would be easy to tell who won. Since that option was beyond serious 
consideration, the only feasible solution involved the employment of 
umpires. Umpiring, thus, became a pivotal factor in the success of a 
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maneuver. If the umpiring was good then the maneuvres were good. Poor 
umpiring was disasterous. Colonel G.T. Forestier-Walker, who was the 
army's umpire expert, spoke to the officers at Aldershot in 1911: "I 
have never heard that position of an umpire is considered to be one of 
dignity or emolument." He divided umpires into three categories accord-
ing to their motives for accepting the assignment: 
a. Because they were ordered to, and couldn't wriggle out 
of it. 
b. Some members of a certain branch of the service have a 
constitutional objection to footslogging. 
c. Because, disagreeable as the duty might be, the momentary 
relation of some of them with their own commanding officer 
rendered a temporary separation almost necessary and at any 
rate, extremely advisable, and when such separation was com-
bined with a possibility of getting a bit of their own back 
in the way of decisions, the path of duty appeared to be 
1 1 . d 108 c ear y po1nte out. 
Prior to 1909, the umpires actually ran the maneuvers. They directed 
the forces on the field by their decisions and left the commander with 
very little initiative. For the 1909 maneuvers new instructions were 
issued. Each company had four yellow casualty screens or flags. If the 
umpire directed that one screen be raised, it signified to the commander 
that he was receiving casualties and that his " ... pace must be 
checked " Increasingly effective fire was signalled by raising 
the second and third screen. When all four were displayed, the commander 
had to make some improvement in the situation or lose his entire force. 
These screens were not to be regarded " ... as a sort of company 
colour, to be bourne as rapidly as possible into the heart of the 
"109 enemy. 
Between, his own casualty screens and those displayed by his 
opponent and supplemented by "word pictures" from the umpire which 
described the situation, the commander, theoretically, had enough in-
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formation on which to base a tactical decision. These "word pictures" 
were very important. Forestier-Walker found that phrases like, "You 
are under heavy fire" were inadequate. These discriptions had to be 
detailed and specific and yet not surrender facts about the enemy 
that he would not normally have in a real battle. Forestier-Halker 
noted in his instructions to umpires that " ... you will find that, 
with a little practice you can draw the most lurid and appalling 
pictures of carnage. .. 110 His advice was to make a decision and 
stick to it. It was permissable for an umpire to give his rationale 
only if it would not betray the other side. Naturally, there would be 
an argument, but Forestier-Walker believed it desirable to " .. let 
the most junior argue if they want to, for you have to let the senior 
ones argue whether you want to or not." 
In conclusion, don't expect that your decision will fill 
everybody with delight. From longish experience, I am 
inclined to think that there are only two occasions on 
which you are entitled to infer from the demeanor of the 
combatants that your decision has been a right one. One 
of these occasions is when neither side is pleased with 
the decision. You may safely conclude that when this 
occurs fairly often, you are doing rather well. The other 
occasion is when both sides express approval of the 
decision. I have never yet met this case.lll 
For the 1908 maneuvers, all the forces were from Aldershot. During 
the first phase (15-18 September), Major-General James M. Grierson's 1st 
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Division acted as the invaders or Red Force and the 2nd Division under 
Major-General T.E. Stephenson was the Blue Force--the defenders of 
England's sacred soil. Smith-Dorrien was the Director and Chief Umpire. 
On the first day of operations (Tuesday, September 16), the 
advance cavalry reconnaissance of both sides probed for their oppo-
nent's positions. During the night, the 2nd South Lancashires, a blue 
regiment, surprised the Cavalry Brigade under Colonel H. de la Gough 
who were fast asleep and captured the entire unit. Uncertain of what 
to do next, the umpire on the scene contacted Sir Horace who said it 
was quite clear--the cavalry brigade was considered to be out of action. 
The elation of the 2nd South Lancashire was only surpassed by the 
humiliation of the cavalry. 
Rain added realism on the second day. Grierson moved his invaders 
northwards and outmarched the blue soldiers to a key ridge. Stephenson 
spent the remainder of the afternoon in piecemeal attacks trying to 
dislodge him. Since the umpires could not decide what to do or which 
side won, Smith-Dorrien directed both sides to disengage, move back, 
and spend the night in administrative bivouac. 
To prevent the same indecisive struggle from occurring again, 
Stephenson was told that he would receive another division as reinforce-
ments and he was to withdraw to a better position and await them. 
Grierson's orders were to continue his advance north-east. Parity of 
strength prevented either side from winning any advantage. Thus ended 
the first phase. 
Grierson's men now became the imaginary division that was to rein-
force Stephenson. Smith-Dorrien assumed control of this new two-division 
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force. Colonel Julian Byng and a skeleton force assumed the role of 
the red units. Colonel Julian Byng broke contact and moved to a better 
defensive position. On the afternoon of the l8th,Smith-Dorrien's 
cavalry patrols found Byng and seized several bridges over a river that 
Byng used as a barrier. Byng's position on a higr~wooded ridge was 
formidable. Sir Horace gave orders that his men would make a night 
march so they could be in position to assault at dawn. It was raining, 
the troops had little rest, and the officers lacked time for a full 
reconnaissance. Maneuverwise press correspondents were doubtful that 
it could be done. A night march in the rain over unfamiliar ground 
II l b h d b ll ll d 1.112 
. . can on y e ac ieve y exceptiona y we traine troops. · 
Smith-Dorrien, however, was confident that his men could do it, and 
he was not disappointed. Press reports of the night march and dawn 
assault were very laudatory; one noted, "The admitted success of the 
maneouvres must be highly gratifying to Sir H.L. Smith-Dorrien . 
the troops at Aldershot have received a systematic and progressive 
training, the results of which greatly impressed all who had the plea-
usre of seeing them."113 
Despite the good reviews, the maneuvers were not flawless. There 
were some problems in march discipline. Also, since each artillery 
piece soon fired its allotted forty rounds of blank ammunition, many 
unit leaders were upset when informed that their obviously successful 
assault was bloodily repulsed by "silent" artillery fire. Administra-
tion, supply, and transport operations were rated as successful, but 
the maneuvres " served to disclose the fact that the art of moving 
transport columns by routes where they will be immune from artillery 
114 fire requires further study." 
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Aldershot continued to steadily chip away at inefficiency and un-
realistic training and to rectify the problems uncovered by the 1908 
Maneuvers. For the 1909 Maneuvers, Sir Horace, the Red Commander, 
pitted his 1st and 2nd Divisions, 1st Cavalry Brigade and the Household 
Cavalry Brigade against the Blue leader--Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur 
Paget, who was assigned the 3rd and 4th Divisions. French and his 
staff set up the problem to resemble the Novara Campaign of 1849. 
French intended that the first day (21 September) would be used to con-
centrate the 50,000 men, the second day for reconnaissance and the 
last day for battle. He did not consider the marching ability of the 
troops--who covered twenty-three to thirty-five miles instead of the 
norm of fifteen--or the aggressiveness of both commanders. By the end 
of the first day his schedule was upset and the official visitors were 
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somewhat confused. 
Each sides' cavalry did a superior job in locating the enemy but 
lost their baggage trains because of poor security. Frequently, the 
umpires had to stop the operation, untangle the troops and start them 
over again. As a result, French and his staff quickly lost control of 
the operation. Although both sides made mistakes in the heavily wooded 
country, Smith-Dorrien seized the initiative, dominated the action, 
and as the Times put it, 
scored a very decisive success. If Sir John French is 
of the same way of thinking it will doubtless in time become 
common knowledge. Meanwhile about certain facts there can be 
no dispute. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was in this country, at 
the time of his taking up the Aldershot Command, known chiefly 
by reputation. He is now recognized by all who have the plea-
sure of serving under him as a trainer and leader of troops of 
the very highest order.ll6 
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Sir John was probably not of the same way of thinking, and Sir Horace's 
good press may have irritated French's already touchy vanity. 
Smith-Dorrien, however, was pleased with his troops, though he was 
still dissatisfied with cooperation among his units. In his view, they 
needed more experience in combined operations before the next autumn 
maneuvers. 
In the last week of August, 1910, it was announced that on the 
12th and 13th of September, Sir Horace would command the 1st and 2nd 
Divisions against the 3rd and 4th Divisions in a rematch of the 1909 
battle. But five days before the maneuvers began, Sir John French used 
his authority to inexplicably pull Smith-Dorrien from his rightful place 
as commander of the Aldershot Forces and replaced him for the duration 
of the maneuvers with Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Plumer. 117 Smith-
Dorrien was posted as Chief Umpire--a no-win assignment. Poor umpiring 
had marred the 1909 series, and with revised but untested umpire rules 
out, if things went wrong, Sir Horace would get the blame. Furthermore, 
the Aldershot Forces were given 5,400 Territorials (25% of total Red 
force) to assimilate into their organization. 
There were some unique aspects of the maneuvers for 1910. Over 
70,000 soldiers were involved--the largest peacetime maneuvers to date. 
Also the dirigible, "Beta" and two airplanes were assigned to the Red 
army for experimental purposes. "Beta" flew over 700 miles and was 
operational on four of the five days. Observers were needed in the air-
planes because the pilot was too busy flying to make accurate observa-
tions. 
Tactically, the maneuvers were indecisive. Again the march 
discipline of support units was found to be wanting. One column made 
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up of two field artillery brigades, one heavy battery and its ammuni-
tion column, two sections of a Royal Engineer Field Company, the 3rd 
Mounted Brigade (Territorial), two companies of mounted infantry, and 
one company of a Transport and Supply column arrived at its destination 
seven hours late. Furthermore, its orders did not specify if the head 
or the tail of the column was to close at the specified time. French 
faulted Plumer for having his forces too widely spread out and criti-
cized Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Douglas for making piecemeal 
attacks. Neither side co-ordinated their operations well. 
As expected, all the umpires came in for blistering criticism. 
Smith-Dorrien accepted it, but resolved not to allow it to happen again. 
As previously mentioned, Sir Horace arranged for Colonel G.T. Forestier-
Walker to speak to the Aldershot Military Society on "Umpiring" in 
April, 1911. In his introduction of Forestier-Walker, Smith-Dorrien 
said: 
You must know that we lost a good deal of credit last 
year at Aldershot for our training, and it was greatly due 
to the way in which the umpire rules were carried out. I 
thought myself--and I prided myself--that the training 
here of all arms was exceedingly well done, and that we had 
attained a very high level of efficiency, and it was there-
fore very disappointing to me, in talking matters over 
afterward with the Inspector-General [French], and in hear-
ing criticisms on manoeuvres generally, to be told that our 
training, though very good had failed on manoeuvres owing 
to the non-appreciation of the proper way of carrying out 
the umpire rules. I said, 'It is all very fine to say this, 
but you must remember the new umpire rules as laid down are 
very vague and indefinite, and I must defend all my officers 
at any rate for not being able to understand them because I 
have had great difficulty in finding out from the War Office 
instructions how we were intended to use these yellow flags 
.... rll8 
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Smith-Dorrien's analysis of the recent maneuvers convinced him 
that additional work was necessary in building inter-branch understand-
ing. Early in 1911, he put his ideas into a memo for the command. 
"The unit which is best trained for war is not necessarily the one which 
is most highly trained as an individual unit, but the one which is best 
able to co-operate efficiently with other units, whether belonging to 
119 the same or any other arm." 
Throughout the rest of 1910 and into the summer of 1911, Smith-
Dorrien had his forces working on mutual-support tactics. And for the 
first time, umpires were used during these exercises to familiarize 
everyone with the manner of their employment. Sir Horace's troops were 
ready for the 1911 Autumn Maneuvers. Unfortunately, Smith-Dorrien never 
had the opportunity to demonstrate the capabilities of his command 
because with the outbreak of the rail riots in London that fall, all 
maneuvers were cancelled and the soldiers were required to patrol the 
city and keep the peace. But Sir Horace did not need the maneuvers to 
prove his worth for that had already been done earlier. 
Smith-Dorrien's greatest contribution in preparing the army for 
the First World War was not in realistic maneuvers, marksmanship, or 
dismounted action by the cavalry, or functional tactics based on common 
sense, or improving the lot of the British soldier. All of the above 
were important,--some were extremely important--and when taken as a 
whole, they amount to a considerable achievement which any general 
would be proud to claim. There was, however, a more important problem 
which attracted Smith-Dorrien's attention. He was concerned about the 
crippling weakness common to practically every military effort launched 
101 
from British shores--mobilization. Very few men had the capability, 
and even fewer possessed the inclination to tackle this problem. Monthly 
kit inspections and annual maneuvers, which were sufficient for years 
and satisfied the authorities that all was well, uncovered about five 
to ten percent of the wrinkles that would become discomfortingly ob-
vious upon full mobilization. Only an officer with Smith-Dorrien's 
attention to detail, his nit-picking thoroughness, and his driving 
professionalism, who was at the same time placed in a position with 
sufficient authority to enforce his views, could have made any headway 
against the institutionalized muddle. Once in command, Sir Horace 
sought to gradually implement his mobilization plans. He did not try 
to undertake a mobilization exercise for the entire corps at Aldershot. 
That was a concept that tottered on the outer limits of fantasy at the 
War Office. Instead, he chose to concentrate on one unit at a time. 
Sir Horace did not waste a moment. During the first week of his 
command he ordered a surprise mobilization of a field ambulance unit. 
His objective was to observe the procedures in assembling the men, 
horses, equipment, and stores and the functions and proficiency by all 
personnel during a combat drill. Needless to say, the mobilization 
order was a surprise but the results were not. "Possibily it is in the 
mind of the new General Officer Commanding to introduce the feature men-
tioned [mobilization] into some portion at least to the ensuing season's 
practice .•.. "120 It certainly would be introduced that season and 
every other season for as long as Sir Horace was there. 
One month later, during the first week in March, a divisional 
artillery unit was mobilized and put through its paces. On Friday, 
March 13, the same was done to the entire transport and supply 
organization of the 1st Division. Captain W.S. Douglas's 1st Cable-
Company joined the number of those units newly initiated into the 
mysteries of mobilization on April 3, 1908. 121 
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By the summer of 1908, even the "thickest brick" saw that this was 
not a passing fancy with the G.O.C. Other unit commanders hurried over 
to speak with their colleagues, who had just finished the ordeal, to 
learn what corrections they needed to make before they too received the 
mobilization order. Suddenly, Sir Horace's staff became very popular 
and were courted by those who had not been under the gun for any leaks 
as to who might be next. 
In the middle of July (1908), the 2nd Scots Guards were inspected 
with their full transport column. These mobilization tests usually 
took two to three days and the unit was literally tested " ... down 
to a bootlace .. 122 All units were brought to full strength by 
soldiers from other units filling the ranks instead of the reserves. 
Reserve horses were borrowed from the Army Service Corps. Smith-
Dorrien and his staff followed and studied the unit from its receipt of 
the mobilization order, through an assembly, a meticulous "glorified 
k~t . . " h d " . f. ld . "123 ~ ~nspect~on, a route marc , an a ... m~nor ~e operat~on. 
Eleven months later, in June 1909, Smith-Dorrien called out an 
entire brigade on a surprise emergency mobilization. By now, everybody 
had learned his job, procedures were streamlined, bottlenecks were 
eliminated,and earlier deficiencies were corrected. Sir Horace ex-
pressed his " . . entire satisfaction with the rapid and successful 
turn out by the troops for immediate service " The correspon-
dent for the Naval and Military Review wrote that same month that 
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mobilization" ... was one of the most important experiments that has 
ever been tried here • . • . He [Smith-Dorrien] started mobilizing 
units and gradually got the whole command accustomed to doing the work 
systematically without shouting, swearing, confusion, and the tearing 
about of gallopers and orderlies."124 
A review of the Army Orders published in the Army List served as 
one indicator of the completeness and importance of Sir Horace's efforts. 
Mobilization Store Tables for at least ninety-two different units and 
functions were introduced or revised as a result of shortcomings dis-
covered by full mobilization. Additionally, inventories and packing 
lists for twenty different wagons or carts were developed and tested for 
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completeness. 
Complementing the practical experience gained in the mechanics of 
mobilization, Sir Horace saw to it that his officers also received some 
specialized tactical instruction through his staff rides. But not all 
his staff rides dealt with problems of attack and defence; he saw combat 
as a far more complex issue than that. One such staff tour of his ran 
from June 27 to July 1, 1910, and was intended " ... to afford officers 
an opportunity of studying the problem of a Line of Communication, such 
as might obtain in the event of an Expeditionary Force being dispatched 
to take part in a Continental War."126 As with all his staff tours, 
Smith-Dorrien recorded his thoughts on various aspects of the staff's 
performance: "In deciding a line of action due attention must of course 
be paid to what the enemy may do, but it is best to begin with what one 
wishes to do one's self, and then consider how it may be interfered 
with by the enemy." 
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Sir Horace reprimanded an officer for ignoring government directives, 
and wrote in the critique of the tour, 11 one of the first princi-
ples of strategy is that it must be in harmony with policy . . like 
it or not, it is a fact that politics always have and always will 
largely dominate strategy . II For officers who would not make a 
decision until they had all the facts on the enemy he advised, " 
the Commander, who is always waiting for more information before making 
up his mind how to act, may find himself compelled finally to conform 
to his enemy's movements , If your plan is really sound, and 
you proceed with it, in 19 cases out of the 20 the enemy will have to 
conform."127 
Sir Horace advocated using every possible advantage, and deception 
was one of them: "The spreading of false information so as to mislead 
the enemy as to your real plans is most important." He was also very 
conscious of security problems: "Remember that Operation Orders are of 
a Confidential nature, and therefore not more should be issued than are 
absolutely necessary.'' He likewise reminded the participants to keep 
all rear staff personnel informed as to the developments of the situation 
so they may conform to new requirements, and to avoid starting a march 
too early. "The importance to the men of getting a good night's rest 
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cannot be exaggerated." One of Smith-Dorrien's continuous themes was, 
"The necessity of being quite clear about your strategic objective, and 
1 . . h f . h . . ,.129 never oslng slg t o lt w en lt comes to tactlcs. 
Not all of Smith-Dorrien's tests of War Office plans and procedures 
were welcomed. On one occasion, Sir Horace decided to use a recently 
received contingency plan as the subject of a staff tour. It dealt 
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with the possible invasion of Britain. Naturally, " ... certain 
defects were exposed which seemed to merit the attention of the authori-
ties .... " After Smith-Dorrien sent his findings to the War Office, 
he received a very stiff, curt answer which stated that the contingency 
was not likely to occur and that there would be international complica-
tions if he tried this again. 130 
Smith-Dorrien's total refurbishing of the army's mobilization ma-
chinery was not wasted on the government. Finally the War Office approved 
the funds required for a mobilization of an entire division to be held 
in July, 1909. Unlike previous mobilization exercises this was not to 
be a surprise. It was designed by Smith-Dorrien; "To show as an object 
lesson a division at war strength both at the halt and on the move; to 
practise its march on one or more roads, and its eventual deployment 
in enclosed country and to practise the tactical handling in action of 
a division complete in all its sources of supply."131 Since the 
reserves of horses and men were not to be called-up, every unit at 
Aldershot was stripped to field a division at war strength. On 27 July 
there was an inspection, a march, and an operation against a skeleton 
enemy. On paper the division consisted of 19,630 men, 7,504 horses, 
70 guns, and 1,130 vehicles. 
Since this was the first time anyone had ever seen a full British 
Division, it drew quite a crowd. Field-Marhsal the Duke of Connaught 
was there to inspect the unit. Also present was the entire Aldershot 
Command and Staff, General Sir Ian Hamilton (Adjutant-General), Major-
General Sir H.S.G. Miles (Quartermaster-General), Lieutenant-General 
Sir Charles Douglas, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Paget~ General Sir 
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Archibald Hunter, Major-General Douglas Haig, the commanders of the 3rd 
and 4th Division, and foreign observers from Russia, France, Japan, 
Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland. Sir 
John French elected not to be at Aldershot for Smith-Dorrien's triumph. 132 
Nobody seemed to realize just how much ground a division would 
require, 133 " such a paraphernalia of war was displayed as to 
shock even the modesty of Mr. Haldane himself. There was scarcely 
134 
room in the county for the division to change front." It took 
twenty-five minutes for a brigade of artillery to pass by the reviewing 
stand. The mobilization proved to be quite an education for all those 
present. It illuminated many flaws and highlighted problems, especially 
in the supply and transport areas. Shortages of both horses and reserv-
ists were items marked down for further study. On a more positive note, 
however, Charles A'court Repington, the famous military correspondent 
for the Times, concluded that·" ... all agreed that the experiment was 
worth the price and that it was admirably conducted by the Aldershot 
C d 11135 omman . Eighteen months later the Naval and Military Record observed 
"The result of last season's mobilization practices have borne fruit, 
and have well justified the new course of procedure adopted by Lieutenant-
General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien . . . various alterations have been 
made as a result of the experiments and these have been embodied in 
memoranda for future guidance. Too much cannot be said for this innova-
tion in military training at home, for it is an application of the semi-
final test of efficiency."136 The next time a British division would 
be at full strength coincided with mobilization for the final test of 
efficiency in August, 1914,--war. 
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In 1911, Sir Horace received a set back to his ongoing plans to 
upgrade the army. He was informed that because of the costs of the 
coronation and the Royal Military Review, there would be no major 
mobilization exercises and that maneuvers would be on a much smaller 
scale than those previously held. 
Time was running out for Smith-Dorrien's tenure at Aldershot. 
It was rumored that he would replace Sir John French in the prestigious 
post as Inspector-General of the Forces. But French would not allow 
Sir Horace to upstage him again; another position would have to be 
found--one out of the country if possible. But Smith-Dorrien had other 
ideas; he declined the offer to Command in South Africa because he 
wanted to be close to any impending action in Europe. When the South-
ern Command was suggested, he accepted, and on February 28, 1912, he 
passed the colors to Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig. Naval and 
Military Record summed up his term and very tactifully referred to 
French's attitude tmvard him: 
The G.O.C. has sought no personal ambition while holding 
this command. . . . It is a difficult thing to please every-
body but Lieutenant-General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien has 
steered tolerably clear of the common pitfalls that await a 
general officer in the head command of the army. In a quiet 
way he has emphasized many lessons in the field which might 
in less careful hands have been destroyed or put back, and 
his innovations have been such as have appealed at once to 
the minds of practical soldiers, especially those in which 
rapid and systematic mobilization are concerned.l37 
But Smith-Dorrien was just doing his duty as a professional officer. 
For him, the four and one half years commanding the "plum of the British 
army" was business as usual. He wrote, "Throughout the period of my 
command at Aldershot, although events of local and temporary interest 
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were jostling one another and one's life was full as it could hold, 
h h f 1 . ..138 t ere was not rnuc o genera lnterest .... 
Two and one half years after Srnith-Dorrien left his post at 
Aldershot, Great Britain was engulfed in the First World War. In 
retrospect, Sir Horace was probably correct in that, compared with 
events in August, 1914, " ... there was not much of general interest 
" during his tenure as G.O.C. During the intervening two and one 
half years, the army had absorbed those lessons Srnith-Dorrien had been 
so insistent upon. Mobilization, England's military bane, ran perfectly--
due to the well rehearsed procedures that had been developed and perfected 
by Srnith-Dorrien. In the retreat from Mons in August, 1914, the cavalry 
covered itself with glory--not by the knee-to-knee charge with leveled 
lances and flashing sabres but by a very successful, tenacious rear 
guard action characterized by a rapid and devastatingly accurate rifle-
fire from dismounted troopers. Besides his views on cavalry, Smith-
Dorrien's emphasis on entrenchments proved correct as did his beliefs 
about the machine gun, artillery, and combined arms operations. 
Sir Horace's confidence in the initiative and the abilities of 
individual soldiers and small unit leaders paid enormous but unrecognized 
dividends in the early months of the war. While commanders and staffs 
struggled to comprehend the awesome scope fo the war, England's regulars 
died holding their positions until new far larger armies were raised and 
trained at horne. "The Old Conternptables" melted away in the white-hot 
inferno of modern combat leaving only a legend and their spirit behind. 
It was not that Srnith-Dorrien's considerable contributions were 
forgotten or taken for granted by the army during the war; rather, it 
was that his ideas, as unpopular as they were in peace, were merely 
absorbed into and accepted by the system. Military institutions are 
like living organisms; often they do not change or evolve toward 
a more efficient system unless forced to do so for survival when 
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faced by new situations. Britain's army found Smith-Dorrien's policies 
to be an expedient and a correct solution, and as a consequence, they 
followed them. 
Despite Sir Horace's important contributions, there were no heroes 
in a peacetime army and by the fall of 1914, there were more important 
things to do than congratulate a general on his validated training 
programs. Nevertheless, when Smith-Dorrien walked away from his Alder-
shot forge in February, 1912, he left behind an impressive new sword 
worthy of its lineage to King Arthur's Excalibur. And if Sir Horace's 
creation was clumsily handled in war, its blade was keen and bright and 
earned the justifiable title--rapier among scythes. Both Smith-Dorrien 
and the men he trained accomplished their mission, and that is all any 
soldier can hope to do. 
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EPILOUGE 
Smith-Dorrien held the Southern Command until the Great War broke 
out, whereupon he became a commander of a Home Defence Army. His unit 
existed only on paper and was part of the Home Defence Central Force 
commanded by General Sir Ian Hamilton. 
On August 17, 1914, the II Corps commander, Lieutenant-General Sir 
James Grierson died from a heart attack enroute to the front. Hamilton 
volunteered for the job, but Sir John French, leader of the British Ex-
peditionary Force wanted Lieutenant-General Herbert Plumer. However, 
Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, owed Smith-Dorrien a 
favor from the Curzon feud, and on August 19, offered the command to 
Sir Horace over French's objections. 
Kitchener was aware of French's feelings toward Smith-Dorrien, but 
Sir Horace assured him that he could get along with French. The King 
asked Smith-Dorrien to keep him informed and told him to ask for Sir 
John's permission to allow Smith-Dorrien to send the King a special war 
diary. The King's "request" only further irritated French and he re-
sented Smith-Dorrien's direct access to the King. 1 
Smith-Dorrien arrived in France on August 21. The fog of war at 
French's headquarters had reduced operational visibility to zero; the 
British flanks were in the air, their French allies were falling back 
rapidly, and the Germans were rolling steadily forward. 
By the 23rd, several facts concerning the front line situation had 
finally filtered through the confused layers of command back to French's 
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headquarters. Sir John cancelled an attack when he was informed that 
over two German corps were approaching. As the German juggernaut col-
lided with the overstretched British lines around Mons, panic set in at 
General Headquarters. Withering rifle-fire from Smith-Dorrien's II 
Corps managed to stop the enemy momentarily. On the 24th, Sir John or-
dered a general withdrawal to re-establish flank contact with the French 
soldiers. This retreat was well executed but extremely difficult be-
cause many units were engaged with the enemy. 
Although they were near total collapse, the soldiers continued 
their fighting withdrawal through the 25th. When Smith-Dorrien's cav-
alry screen informed him early on the 26th that they could not hold off 
the Germans any longer, Sir Horace consulted with his subordinate com-
manders, evaluated the chances, and bravely took the decision to stand 
and fight at Le Cateau--against orders. He knew that if the exhausted 
soldiers tried to continue the retreat they would be destroyed. He was 
confident that his men could stop the Germans long enough for the rear 
echelons to escape which would clear the roads so that his men could 
then follow unhampered. His decision was a desperate gamble, but Smith-
Dorrien felt that the odds were on his side--and he was right. 
John Terraine, a respected military historian, wrote that Le Cateau 
was, " . one of the most splendid feats of the British Army during 
the whole of the war."2 Smith-Dorrien was cool, steady, and unflap-
pable in the battle, while despair was the dominant emotion at the 
B.E.F. Headquarters. Sir John, who prophisied a British disaster at 
Le Cateau, never forgave Sir Horace for embarrassing him.once again. 
From then on, French was quick to find nonexistant faults with every-
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thing that the II Corps (and later Smith-Dorrien's 2nd Army) did or 
failed to do through the battles of the Marne, Aisne, and Ypres. 
Finally, in May 1915, during the Second Battle of Ypres, French 
relieved Smith-Dorrien of his command and sent Sir Horace's old friend, 
General Sir William Robertson to inform him, " 'orace, You're for 
'ome."3 French had labelled Smith-Dorrien's request to withdraw slightly 
to a much better defensive position as a defeatist attitude and bluntly 
refused to allow it. Smith-Dorrien realized that French's hostility 
toward him was hurting the war effort so he offered to resign--but 
French had already decided to sack him. Plumer was Sir Horace's re-
placement, and it was ironic that Plumer's first act was to put Smith-
Dorrien's plan of withdrawal into effect with French's full approval. 
Upon his return to England, Smith-Dorrien was given command of the 
First Home Defence Army. He also received the Grand Cross of the Order 
of St. Michael and St. George, but the honor rang hollow. 
In November 1915, he was selected for the independent command of 
the expedition to East Africa. Enroute, he became deathly ill and was 
invalided home from Capetown in February 1916 before he assumed command. 
It would have been an interesting campaign; Sir Horace might have been 
the only British officer capable of catching the legendary Lieutenant-
General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck. 
After his recovery, Smith-Dorrien was on half-pay but was still 
too proud to accept the charity of the Bermuda Command; he wanted to be 
a productive part of the war. In September 1918, the position of Gov-
ernor-General of Gibralter was tendered, and he gladly accepted it for 
he felt that he could be useful there. Gibralter was a happy assign-
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ment, and he and his family stayed there until his retirement in 1923. 
Seven years later, Smith-Dorrien was returning from assisting a friend 
with his ailing garden when a car crashed into his vehicle and fractured 
his skull. He died the next day (August 12, 1930) and was buried with 
full military honors at St. Peter's Eaton Square. His guard of honor 
was, of cour~e, from his old regiment, the Sherwood Foresters. Sir 
Horace was next on the Army List for a Field-Marshal's baton--a rank 
and honor that would have been his fifteen years earlier if French 
had not considered him as an enemy. 
Alan Clark, in his critical account of the British generals in 
World War I, wrote, 
Smith-Dorrien was a clever, sensitive and rational man. No other 
officer of equivalent senority--with the possible exception of 
Ian Hamilton, was his equal intellectualy, and none could rival 
his ability in handling large numbers of men with economy and 
decision.4 
Sir John Fortescue, an expert on the history of the British army, noted, 
"Never was a British soldier less hidebound by the traditions and pre-
judices of the Regular Army. He saw good in every man who wore the 
King's uniform."5 Perhaps his character was best summarized by a bands-
man who paid him the soldier's highest complement when he remarked to 
Lady Srnith-Dorrien that her husband was, " •.. a real gentleman, and 
not a bit like a general."6 Sir Horace's lifetime devotion and loyalty 
to his soldiers were not forgotten by the men he commanded. Upon his 
removal from the 2nd Army, he received scores of letters expressing 
outrage at French and sympathy and support from officers, NCO's, and 
privates. His diary reveals that he was deeply touched by these un-
expected sentiments and that these letters helped ease the hurt of his 
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dismissal. 
There was a strong possibility that Sir Horace would have replaced 
French as commander of the B.E.F. instead of Haig. But in any case, it 
is idle speculation on how well the swordsmith would have wielded his 
own creation. The evidence is that he would have at least been a more 
effective leader than Sir John. Although nobody really foresaw the 
scope of the Great War, Smith-Dorrien understood its nature and pre-
pared the army for it. 
It was unfortunate that French's animosity toward Smith-Dorrien 
interfered with the war effort. French probably remembered the old 
army adage, "An off~cer, that has an iota of knowledge above the common 
run, you must consider as your personal enemy."7 Therein lies the 
tragedy and reason for Smith-Dorrien's ultimate downfall. He was too 
successful a subordinate for such a jealous and vindictive superior. 
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Appendix A: Organization of the Aldershot Command 1907-12. 
1st Cavalry Brigade (Colonel Julian Byng) 
7th Queen's Own Hussars 
16th The Queen's Lancers* 
21st (Empress of India's) Lancers 
1st Infantry Division (Major-General James Moncrief£ Grierson) 
1st Brigade (Colonel F. Llyod) 
2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards* 
2nd Battalion Scotts Guards 
2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers 
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2nd Battalion The Prince of Wale's Own (West Yorkshire) Reg-
iment 
2nd Brigade (Colonel Sir Henry H. Rawlinson) 
2nd Battalion The King's (Liverpool Regiment) 
2nd Battalion Prince of Wale's Volunteers (South Lancashire 
Regiment)* 
1st Battalion North Staffordshire Regiment (The Prince of 
Wale's)* 
1st Battalion Prince of Wale's Leinster Regiment (Royal Can-
adians) 
3rd Brigade (Brigadier-General W.P. Campbell) 
2nd Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment 
1st Battalion Cheshire Regiment* 
1st Battalion Welsh Regiment 
1st Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment 
2nd Infantry Division (Major-General T.E. Stephenson) 
4th Brigade (This unit was stationed in London as part of the Lon-
don District and formed part of the command on mobilization 
and when so ordered on maneuvers.) 
5th Brigade (Colonel A.H. Henniker-Major) 
1st Battalion Princess of Wale's Own (Yorkshire) Regiment 
1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders* 
2nd Battalion Royal Irish Rifles* 
2nd Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment 
6th Brigade (Colonel C.J. Mackenzie) 
1st Battalion the Buffs (East Kent) Regiment* 
2nd Battalion The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry* 
3rd Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps 
2nd Battalion Scottish Rifles 
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Change of Station: 
Date 
1908 
Feb. 
Jul. 
Oct. 
Nov. 
1909 
Jan. 
Sep. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
1910 
Jan. 
Oct. 
Bri-
gade 
2 
5 
6 
1 
Cav 
2 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
2 
2 
Cav 
1 
1 
1 
5 
5 
3 
1 
6 
Cav 
1 
1 
2 
3 
3 
3 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
Departing 
Unit 
2 Liverpool 
1 Yorkshire 
3 KRRC 
2 Gren Gds 
21 Lancers 
2 S. Lancashire 
2 R. Warwickshire 
1 Welsh 
1 s. Staffordshire 
3 Gren Gds 
2 Scotts Gds 
1 N. Staffordshire 
1 Leinster 
16 Lancers 
1 Gren Gds 
1 Coldstream Gds 
2 S.W. Borderers 
2 R. Irish Rifle 
2 Gloucester shire 
1 Cheshire 
2 W. Yorkshire 
2 Scottish Rifles 
7 Hussars 
1 Scotts Gds 
1 Irish Gds 
2 R. Irish Rifles 
1 Worcestershire 
1 E. Yorkshire 
3 Rifle Brigade 
2 Lincolnshire 
1 Gordon Highland 
1 E. Kent 
2 York L.I. 
1 R. Irish Fusil 
Arriving 
Unit 
1st Bn East Lancashire* 
2nd Bn Lincolnshire 
1st Bn Royal Irish Fusiliers* 
3rd Bn Grenadier Guards 
3rd Dragoon Guards 
2nd Bn Royal Irish Rifles* 
1st Bn Worcestershire 
1st Bn East Yorkshire 
3rd Bn Rifle Brigade* 
1st Bn Grenadier Guards* 
1st Bn Coldstream Guards* 
2nd Bn Royal Dublin Fusiliers* 
2nd Bn York and Lancaster* 
19th Hussars 
1st Bn Scotts Guards* 
1st Bn Irish Guards* 
1st Bn Queen's Own Cameron Highland 
4th Royal Fusiliers* 
4th Bn Duke of Cambridge's Own 
(Middlesex)* 
1st Bn Queen's Own Royal West Kent* 
1st Bn Norfolk 
1st Bn Leicestershire* 
2nd Dragoon Guards* 
2nd Bn Grenadier Guards* 
2nd Bn Coldstream Guards* 
1st Bn Dorest* 
2nd Bn Border 
1st Bn Royal Irish Fusiliers* 
2nd Bn Middlesex 
2nd Bn Suffolk* 
1st Bn Bedfordshire* 
1st Bn East Yorkshire 
1st Bn Hampshire* 
2n Bn Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers* 
ers* 
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1911 
Oct. Cav 3 Dragoon Gds 11th Hussars 
1 2 Gren Gds 2nd Bn Scots Guards 
1 2 Goldstream Gds 3rd Bn Goldstream Guards* 
2 1 E. Lancashire 2nd Bn Oxfordshire and Buckingham-
shire Light Infantry* 
2 2 y & L 2nd Bn Yorkshire 
3 1 R.W. Kent 1st Bn Prince Albert's Somerset 
Infantry* 
3 1 R. Irish Fusil 2nd Bn Essex* 
5 4 Middlesex 1st Bn North Lancashire* 
6 1 E. Yorkshire 1st Bn Kin 's Ro al Rifle Cor s* 
Note: Those units that were part of the British Expeditionary Force 
are designated by an "*" 
Light 
Appendix B: Positions of Selected Officers at Aldershot and in the 
Great War 
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Officers who served under Smith-Dorrien at Aldershot were undoubt-
edly influenced to some degree by his policies and practices. Natur-
ally, many of these officers rose to positions of great responsibility 
during World War I. Listed below are selected officers with their pos-
itions at Aldershot (1) and in the Great War (2). 
Baldock, T.S. 
1. Commander, Royal Artillery, 2nd Division (December 1907-April 
1910). 
2. General Officer Commanding (G.O.C.) 49th (West Riding) Division, 
IV Corps (May 1915). 
Burton, B. 
1. Commander, Royal Artillery, 1st Division, (December 1907-0ctober 
1910). 
2. G.O.C. Northumbrian Division (October 1914). 
Byng, Julian H.G. 
1. Commander, 1st Cavalry Brigade (December 1907-April 1909). 
2. G.O.C. Force in Egypt (1914); G.O.C. 3rd Cavalry Division (Feb-
ruary 1915); G.O.C. IX Corps at Suvla Bay, Gallipoli (August 
1915); G.O.C. XVII Corps, France (February 1916); G.O.C. Cana-
dian Corps (May 1916); G.O.C. 3rd Army (March 1918). 
Chetwode, P.W. 
1. Assistant Military Secretary to Smith-Dorrien (December 1907-
June 1908). 
2. Commander, 5th Cavalry Brigade, B.E.F. (August 1914). 
Davies, F.J. 
1. General Staff Officer, 1st Grade, 1st Infantry Division (Jan-
uary 1908-November 1909); Commander, lst Brigade (November 
1909- August 1910); Chief, General Staff at Aldershot Headquart-
ers (August 1910-1912). 
2. G.O.C. 8th Division, IV Corps (February 1915). 
De Lisle, H. de B. 
1. General Staff Officer 1st Grade, 2nd Infantry Division (March 
1910-0ctober 1911). 
2. Commander, 2nd Cavalry Brigade, B.E.F. (August 1914); G.O.C. 
1st Cavalry Division (Febuary 1915); G.O.C. XII Corps (April 
1918). 
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Findlay, N.D. 
1. Commander, Royal Artillery, 1st Division (August 1910-February 
1912). 
2. Commander, Royal Artillery, 1st Infantry Division, B.E.F. (Aug-
ust 1914). 
Grierson James M. 
1. G.O.C. 1st Infantry Division (December 1907-August 1910). 
2. G.O.C. II Corps, B.E.F. (August 1914). He died of a heart 
attack enroute to the front and Smith-Dorrien was his replace-
ment. 
Hammersley, F. 
1. Commander, 3rd Brigade (January 1908-August 1910). 
2. G.O.C. 11th Division (Northern) (October 1914). 
Henderson, D. 
1. General Staff Officer 1st Grade, 1st Infantry Division (Decem-
ber 1907-January 1908). 
2. Commander, Royal Flying Corps (May 1915). 
Kavanaugh, C.T. 
1. Commander, 1st Cavalry Brigade (May 1909-January 1912). 
2. G.O.C. 2nd Cavalry Division (February 1915); G.O.C. Cavalry 
Corps (March 1918). 
Landon, F.W.B. 
1. Assistant Director of Supplies and Transport (February 1908-
0ctober 1908). 
2. Major-General, Director of Transports and Movements, Depart-
ment of the Quartermaster-General to the Forces (July 1914). 
Law, R.T.H. 
1. Assisant Director of Ordnance Stores (May 1909-February 1912). 
2. Inspector of Army Ordnance Services, Department of the Quarter-
master-General to the Forces (July 1914). 
Lomax, S.H. 
1. G.O.C. 1st Infantry Division (August 1910-1912). 
2. G.O.C. 1st Infantry Division (August 1914). 
Mackenzie, C.J. 
1. Commander, 6th Brigade (December 1907-0ctober 1910). 
2. G.O.C. Highland Division, Scottish Command (July 1914); G.O.C. 
9th (Scottish) Division, Aldershot (October 1914); G.O.C. 61st 
(South Midland) Division, XVII Corps (March 1918). 
Macready, C.F.N. 
1. Commander, 2nd Brigade (August 1909-June 1910). 
2. Director of Personal Services, Adjutant-General to the Forces 
(June 1910-August 1914); Adjutant-General (October 1914); 
Adjutant-General, B.E.F. (February 1915). 
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Maxse, F.I. 
1. Commander, 1st Brigade (August 1910-February 1912). 
2. G.O.C. 1st Brigade (Guards), B.E.F. (August 1914); G.O.C. 
XVIII Corps (March 1918). 
Morland, T.L.N. 
1. Commander, 2nd Brigade (June 1910-February 1912). 
2. G.O.C. 5th Division (February 1915). 
Rawlinson, H.S. 
1. Commander, 2nd Brigade (December 1907-August 1909). 
2. G.O.C. IV Corps (February 1915); G.O.C. 5th Army (April 1918). 
He and Smith-Dorrien served together in Egypt in 1898 and he 
commanded the only regular division in the Southern Command 
when Smith-Dorrien was the G.O.C. 
Robertson, William R. 
1. Assistant Quartermaster-General, Aldershot (December 1907-
February 1908); Chief, General Staff, Aldershot (February 1908-
August 1910). 
2. Commandant, Staff College (August 1910-1912); Director of Mili-
tary Training, Imperial General Staff (July 1914); Quarter-
master-General, B.E.F. (October 1914); Chief, General Staff, 
B.E.F (February 1915); Chief, Imperial General Staff (1916). 
Sandbach, A.E. 
1. Commander, Royal Engineers, 1st Infantry Division (July 1908-
November 1908). 
2. Commander, Royal Engineers, II Corps (Smith-Dorrien's) B.E.F 
(1914). He and Smith-Dorrien fought together at Omdurman in 
1898. 
Scott-Moncrief, G.K. 
1. Chief Engineer, Aldershot (August 1910-0ctober 1911). 
2. Director of Fortifications and Works, Department of the Master-
General of the Ordnance (July 1914). 
Wing, F.D.V. 
1. Staff Officer for Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery, Alder-
shot (December 1907-0ctober 1910). 
2. Commander, Royal Artillery, 1st Army (February 1915); G.O.C. 
12th (Eastern) Division (September 1915). 
Appendix C: Selected Lectures Presented to the Aldershot Military 
Society 1908-1912 
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This organization was composed of officers who sought to promote 
greater professionalism within the officer corps. Most of the lectures 
were presented in the winter during the "individual training " phase. 
Normally, the subject matter was quite broad in scope, however a great 
deal of it was oriented toward current problems and future expectations. 
Listed below are fifteen lectures selected to demonstate the nature 
of these presentations. 
November 12, 1908. Captain J.W. O'Dowda, "A Sununary of the Campaigns 
Which Led Up to the Wilderness Campaign." 
December, 1908. Mr. Arthur Drosy, Vice President of the Japan Society, 
"Raw Material of the Japanese Army." 
December, 1908. Major C.E. Budworth, Chief Instructor, Royal Artillery 
School of Gunnery, "Tactical Employment of Artillery as Evolved 
on the Practise Ground and From the Experiences of Modern War." 
January 27, 1909. Charles A'Court Repington, "The Future of Army Organ-
ization." 
January 28, 1909. Colonel A.E. Sandbach, "The Use of Field Telegraphs 
in War." 
February 23, 1909. Major-General Sir W.G. Knox, "The Problem \)f Our 
Army Horse and His Rider and Driver." 
November 16, 1909. T. Miller Maguire, "The Peninsular War, 1808-1814, 
and the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, Compared from the Strategic 
Point of View." 
February 22, 1910. Lord Montague of Beaulieu, "Aerial Machines and 
War." 
December 5, 1910. Brigadier-General Henry H. Wilson, Director of Mili-
tary Operations, War Office, "Initiative and the Power of Manoe-
uvre." 
January 6, 1911. Major-General F.J. Alymer, "French Views on the Tac-
tical Employment of Field Artillery." 
January, 1911. Major C.E. Budworth, "Artillery in Co-operation with 
Infantry." 
January 17, 1911. Brigadier-General F.C Heath, "Royal Engineers in 
Co-operation with Other Arms." 
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February 21, 1911. Colonel H. de Lisle, "Mounted Troops in Co-opera-
tion with Other Arms." 
April 10, 1911. Colonel G.T. Forestier-Walker, "Umpiring." 
November 26, 1912. Lieutenant-Colonel F.F. Hall, "Co-operation Be-
tween Infantry and Artillery and the Best Means of Attaining It." 
Appendix D: Chronology of Smith-Dorrien's Career 
May 26, 1858. Born in Haresfoot, Berkhampstead. 
1872. Educated at Harrow. 
December, 1875. Passed entrance exam for the Royal Military College 
at Sandhurst. 
January 1876-December 1876. Cadet at Sandhurst. 
January 4, 1877. Joined 95th Regiment of Foot in Dublin and Cork, 
Ireland as a lieutenant. 
1878-1879. Fought in the Zulu War in South Africa. 
1880-August 1882. Service with the 2nd Battalion Sherwood Foresters 
(old 95th Foot) in Ireland, England, and Gilbralter. 
August 21, 1882-February 1883. Service with his regiment in Egypt. 
He saw action around Alexandria and was promoted to captain on 
August 22, 1882. 
February 1883-January 1884. On sick leave in England after injuring 
knee in India enroute to his unit's cantonment. 
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January 1884-February 1886. Service in Egypt. While returning to India, 
Smith-Dorrien accepted a position in the Egyptian army under Sir 
Evelyn Wood. He saw combat near Suakin and along the Nile River. 
February 1886-June 1886. On leave in England studying for the entrance 
exam to the Staff College at Camberly. 
June 1886-January 1887. Back in Egypt awaiting the start of the Staff 
College. 
January 1887- December 1888. Staff College. 
January 1889-April 1892. In India with the 2nd Battalion Sherwood 
Foresters. 
April 1892-April 1893. Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General of the 
Oudh District, Bengal, India. Promoted to major on May 11, 
1892. 
April 1893-December 1893. On leave in India. 
December 1893-0ctober 1894. Returned to his position as D.A.A.G., Oudh. 
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October 1894-April 1895. Assistant Adjutant-General, Umballa, India. 
April 1895-August 1895. Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-
General to a reserve brigade in the Chitral Campaign on the North-
west Frontier. 
August 1895-April 1896. Returned to previous job as A.A.G., Umballa. 
April 1896-June 1896. Service with Sherwood Foresters in India. 
June 1896-0ctober 1896. On leave in England. 
October 1896-April 1898. On active service in the Tirah Campaign in 
Afghanistan. 
April 1898-December 1898. 
battle of Omdurman. 
20, 1898. 
On active service in Egypt: fought in the 
Promoted to brevet lieutenant-colonel on May 
January 1899-December 1899. Commanded 1st Battalion Sherwood Foresters 
on Malta. 
December 1899-April 1901. Fought in Boer War. Commanded the 19th 
Brigade and later the 21st Division. Promoted to major-general 
on February 11, 1900 (age 42). 
May 1901-November 1901. On leave in England. 
November 1901-April 1903. Adjutant-General of the Indian Army. On 
September 3, 1902, Smith-Dorrien married Miss Olive Crofton 
Sneider while on a short official leave to England. 
April 1903-December 1907. G.O.C. 4th Division, Quetta, India. Pro-
moted to lieutenant-general in December 1907. 
December 1907-February 1912. G.O.C.-in-C., Aldershot Command. 
February 1912-August 1914. G.O.C.-in-C., Southern Command. Promoted 
to general on August 10, 1912. 
1914- August, 18. Smith-Dorrien appointed to command II Corps, B.E.F. 
August 23-24. Battle of Mons. 
August 26. Battle of Le Cateau. 
September 9. Battle of the Marne. 
September 13-0ctober 3. Battle of the Aisne. 
October 12-November 15. Battle of Ypres. 
December 25. Appointed to command 2nd Army. 
1915- April 22. German gas attack. 
May 7. Relieved of command by Sir John French and sent home 
to England. 
June 22. Appointed to command the 1st Home Defence Army. 
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November 22. Appointed to command the East African Expedition. 
1916- February 13. Invalided home from Capetown with severe 
pneumonia. 
1918-1923. Governor-General of Gibralter. 
1923-1930. Retired. 
August 11, 1930. Fatally injured in an automobile accident and died 
the nest day at age 72. 
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Appendix E: Organizational Diagram of an Infantry Division 
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Appendix F: Organizational Table for an Infantry Division (1909-1912) 
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Infantry 
Battalion 
Machine 
Gun 
Section 
Company 
Major 
Str 
(Ca 
Subaltern 
Sergeants 
Drummers 
Corporals 
Privates 
Total 
ength at: War Home 
ptain) 1 1 
s 2 2 
5 4 
2 2 
5 5 
105 85 
120 99 
Included in the total for the company are six 
signallers, two stretcher bearers, two drivers 
for the pack animals, and three batmen. 
A total of 415 rounds per rifle were distributed 
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as follows: 115 rounds on each soldier and 100 
rounds in the battalion reserve (sixteen boxes of 
1000 rounds each on each of the five Small Arms 
Ammunition Carts and two boxes on each of the eight 
pack animals). Another 100 rounds were in the Field 
Artillery Brigade Ammunition Column and another 100 
rounds per weapon were in the Divisional Ammunition 
Column. 
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Composition of an Infantry Battalion and an Infantry Brigade 
Headquarters 
Infantry Battalion Headquarters 
Lieutenant-Colonel 
Major 
Adjutant (Captain) 
Quartermaster 
Transport Officer 
Signal Officer 
Sergeant-Major 
Sergeants 
Drivers 
Medical Officer Order-
lies 
Batmen 
Total 
Attached: 
Medical Officer 
Armorer 
Army Serive Corps 
Drivers(ASC) 
Royal Army Medi-
cal Corps 
Grand Total 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1(a) 
1 (a) 
1 
8 
10 
2 
6 
31 
1 
1 
10 
5 
48 
In tool carts or on pack 
animals were 222 shovels, 148 
picks, eighteen felling axes, 
nine hand axes, 40 bill hooks, 
one hand saw, one cross cut 
saw, twenty reaping hooks, 
eight crow bars, and twenty 
sand bags. 
Note "a": The signal 
officer, transport officer, 
and machine gun section lead-
er were subalterns provided 
by the companies. In war, 
therefore, three companies 
were short one of their two 
subalterns. 
Infantry Brigade Headquarters 
Brigadier-General 
Aide de Camp (ADC) 
Brigade-Major 
Staff Captain 
Signal Officer 
Signallers 
Clerk 
Military Mounted 
Police 
Army Post Office 
Corps 
Cook 
Batmen 
Army Service Corps 
Drivers 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
5 
4 
1 
10 
5 
Total: five officers, three 
sergeants, twenty-seven rank 
and file, twenty-five horses, 
one General Service (G.S.) 
Wagon with 120 shovels, 80 
pickaxes, and eight crowbars, 
and one G.S. Wagon for baggage 
and supplies. 
Infantry Battalion 
Battalion 
Total(8 
Mach Companies) 
HQ Gun Home War 
Officers 5 -- 29 29 
Sergeants 10 1 41 51 
Corporals 
-- --
40 41 
Drummers 
-- --
16 16 
Rank & File 33 14 680 887 
Total personnel 48 15 801 1024 
Horses: Riding 9 1 10 10 
Draught 39 4 43 43 
Pack 2 -- 18 18 
Total animals so 5 71 71 
S.A.A. carts 5 1 6 6 
Medical carts 1 
--
1 1 
Forage carts 2 -- 2 2 
Water carts 2 -- 2 2 
' 
G.S. Wagons 4 1 5 5 
Machine guns -- 2 2 2 
Total vehicles 14 2 16 16 
Infantry Briga 
( 4 battalion 
War Home 
121 121 
204 164 
164 160 
64 64 
3578 2720 
4131 3229 
56 56 
181 181 
72 72 
309 309 
24 24 
4 4 
8 8 
8 8 
22 22 
8 8 
66 66 
de 
s) 
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Composition of Artillery Batteries 
Royal Horse 
Artillery 
a. b. 
Officers 5 5 
Sergeants 9 9 
Trumpeters 2 2 
Corporals 5/6 7 
Bombadiers 5/6 11 
Artificers 6/7 9 
Rank & File 112/140 158 
Attached ASC 
drivers 
-- 7 
Total 144/175 208 
Horses 94/135 234 
Vehicles incl. 
guns with 21 21 
limbers 
"a." signifies Home Strength 
"b." signifies War Strength 
Royal Field 
Artillery 
a. b. 
5 5 
8/9 9 
2 2 
4/6 7 
4/6 11 
6 9 
103/129 135 
-- 5 
132/163 203 
60/90 180 
21 21 
"-!-" signifies lower/higher establishment 
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Heavy Battery 
60 Pounder 
b. 
5 
8 
2 
7 
6 
8 
128 
5 
171 
118 
14 
A battery's six guns were divided into three sections of two 
guns each Each gun made up a sub-section. Royal Horse Artillery 
used a "13 pounder" quick-firing gun and the Royal Field Artillery 
were issued guns that fired an eighteen pound projectile. A how-
izter battery was identical in organization to the Royal Field Ar-
tillery battery except that it had twelve less rank and file. There 
were only four guns instead of six in a heavy battery. 
Location of Ammunition 
RHA RFA 
Rpunds per gun with the battery 176 176 
Rounds per gun in the Brigade Ammo Column 220 202 
Rounds per gun in the Divisional Ammo Column 144 120 
Total rounds per gun 540 498 
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Composition of Artillery Briagdes (War Strength) 
Royal Field Royal Horse 
Artillery Brigade Artillery Brigade 
HQ Three Ammo Tot- HQ Two Ammo Tot-
Btry Clmn al Btry Clmn al 
Officers 5 15 5 25 5 10 4 19 
Sergeants 1 27 10 38 1 18 10 29 
Corporals 2 21 9 32 
--
14 6 20 
Bombadiers 2 33 9 44 3 22 7 31 
Trumpeters 1 6 2 9 1 4 2 7 
Artificers 1 27 14 42 1 18 14 33 
Gunners & Drivers 12 465 267 744 24 316 177 517 
Total personnel 35 609 316 960 35 416 231 682 
Guns w/limbers 
--
18 
-- 18 -- 12 -- 12 
Ammo Wagons w/ 
limbers -- 36 18 54 -- 24 12 36 
S.A.A Wagons w/ 
limbers -- -- 9 9 -- -- 6 6 
G.S. Wagons, ammo 
-- --
21 21 
-- --
12 12 
S.A.A. Carts 
-- -- 7 7 -- -- 8 8 
Water/Medical 
carts 
-- 3/- 1/- 4/- -/1 2/- 1/- 3/1 
G.S. Wagons, 
baggage 2 6 2 10 2 4 5 11 
Total vehicles 
incl. guns 2 63 58 123 2 42 44 88 
Horses 30 540 389 959 31 468 290 789 
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Cavalry Regiment at War Strength 
Headquarters 3 Squadrons Machine Total 
& Transport each has: Gun 
Section Section 
Officers 6 6 1 25 
Sergeants 7 10 1 38 
Artificers 4 8 
-- 28 
Trumpeters 
-- 2 -- 6 
I 
Rank & File 29 134 23 454 
Total personnel 46 160 25 551 
Horses: Riding 23 155 21 509 
Draught 28 10 8 66 
Pack 1 2 
-- 7 
Total animals 52 167 29 582 
Carts 2 -- -- 2 
G.S. Wagons 6 -- -- 6 
S.A.A. Wagon & 
limber 
--
1 
-- 3 
G.S. Wagon: tools 
& equipment 
--
1 2 5 
Total vehicles 8 2 2 16 
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Cavalry 25 Officers 
Regiment 526 Other Ranks 
I I 
Cavalry 1-- Machine Transport 
Squadron r-- Gun Section 
Section 
I 
I 1 Officer 8 G.S. Wago ns 
\ 
14 Other Ranks 
1 Machine Gun 
Cavalry - ~ Troop 
-
l 
l 
I 
Every regiment should have trained men in the following skills: 
one officer, one sergeant, and eight regimental scouts (First Class) 
and sixteen squadron scouts (Second Class); four dispatch riders per 
squadron; no less than twelve pioneers per squadron; all officers and 
three-forths of the sergeants capable of judging distance; one officer, 
one NCO, and eight men per squadron trained in signalling. 
Each regiment carried the following tools: eighteen shovels, 
twelve pickaxes, thirteen felling axes, nine hand axes, four hand saws, 
three cross-cut saws, thirty-six reaping hooks, three crow bars, 150 
sandbags, and 153 pounds of guncotton in six inch by three inch by one 
and one-eighth inch blocks. 
Ammunition Location Rounds/Rifle 
With Weapon 
In Regimental Reserve 
In Brigade .~unition Column 
In Divisional Ammunition Column 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Total 400 
Machine Gun 
3,500 
16,000 
10,000 
10,000 
39,500 
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